UNITED STATES v. CLARK.

character of the publications. See, also, Brown v. Croome, 2 Stark.
297; Toogood v. S'pring, 1 Cr., M. & R. 181; Bank v. Hentz, 7
App. Cas. 741. It is possible that the principle of these cases would
apply to printed reports of matters of record affecting the credit of
business men, unless some precautions were taken to restrict the
circulation of such reports to the business community, which is
the only part of the community which has a legitimate interest in
them.
Louis M. GREELEY.
Chicago.
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UNITED STATES v. JAMES CLARK.
The circuit court has jurisdiction of a homicide committed by one soldier upon
another within a military reservation of the United States.
If a homicide be committed by a military guard without malice, and in the performance of his supposed duty as a soldier, such homicide is excusable unless it was
manifestly beyond the scope of his authority, or was such that a man of ordinary
sense and understanding would know that it was illegal.
It seems, that the sergeant of a guard has the right to shoot a military convict, if
there be no other possible means of preventing his escape.
The common law distinction between felonies and misdemeanors has no application

to military offences.
While the finding of a court of inquiry acquitting the prisoner of all blame is not
a legal bar to a prosecution, it is entitled to great weight as an expression of the
views of the military court of the necessity of using a musket to prevent the escape
of the deceased.

ON complaint before the district judge as a committing magistrate
for murder upon the Fort Wayne military reservation.
Arthur Stone, the deceased, was a private soldier of Co. I., 23d
Regt. United States Infantry, and, at the.time of the homicide, was
under conviction of a court-martial for "conduct prejudicial to
good order and military discipline," and had been sentenced "to
be dishonorably discharged from the service of the United States,
forfeiting all pay and allowances due or to become due, and to be
confined at hard labor at such military prison as the reviewing
authority may direct for two years." The prisoner was the sergeant of the guard having him in custody at the time. On the
11th day of July, at " retreat," all the prisoners in the guard-house,
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six in number, had been taken out of the guard-house for roll-call
and inspection, and -were standing in a line with their backs to the
guard-house, in charge of a squad of armed soldiers. As Lieut.
Wieton, officer of the day, and the prisoner, the sergeant of the
guard, were entering the guard-house to inspect it, and just as the
prisoner was crossing the threshold of the outer door, deceased, who
was standing at the end of the line of prisoners, broke from the
ranks, ran around the corner of a fence in line with the guard-house
and toward the public highway in front of the military reserve, from
which it was separated by a board fence about six feet in height.
As he left the ranks an outcry was raised, and the quartermastersergeant, who happened to see the escape, and a private by the
name of Duff, started in pursuit, calling upon him to halt, the
iergeant adding, " There is a load after you." Clark hearing
the outcry turned and seized a cartridge from his box, hastily
loaded his musket and ran around the guard-house in the direction
which Stone had taken. At this time Stone was about thirty yards.
ahead of his nearest pursuer, Duff, who did not seem to be gaining
upon him, and stood little if any chance of overtaking him before
he could gain the street. Just as he was crossing the military road
within the reserve and about to leap a rail fence parallel with this
road, and about thirty-five yards from the outer fence and about
eighty yards from the guard-house, Clark fired and hit Stone in the
back just above the hips, inflicting a wound from which he died in
the course of the evening. No ill feeling existed between the men ;
in fact they had always been upon very friendly terms, and it was
at least doubtful whether Clark knew it was Stone when he fired.
C. P. Black, District-Attorney, Charles T. Wilkins, Assistant
District-Attorney and Levi T. Grifln, for the prosecution.
Asa B. Gardner, Judge Advocate-General, Sylvester Larned,
Allen Fraserand James C. Smith, for the defence.
BROWN, J.-In view of the fact that this was a homicide, committed by one soldier, in the performance of his alleged duty, upon
another soldier, within a military reservation of the United States,
I had at first some doubt whether a civil court could take cognisance
of the case at all; but as crimes of this nature have repeatedly been
made the subject of inquiry by civil tribunals, I have come to the
conclusion that I ought not to decline to hear this complaint.
Indeed it is difficult to see how I could refuse to do so without
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abdicating that supremacy of the civil power which is a fundamental
principle of the Anglo-Saxon policy. While there is no statute
expressly conferring such jurisdiction, there is a clear recognition
of it in the 59th Article of War, which provides that "when any
officer or soldier is accused of a capital crime, or of any offence
against the person or property of any citizen of any of the United
States, which is punishable by the laws of the land, the commanding
officer, and the officers of the regiment, troop, battery, company or
detachment, to which the person so accused belongs are required
(except in time of war), upon application duly made by or in behalf
of the party injured, to use their utmost endeavors to deliver him
over to the civil magistrate, and to aid the officers of justice in
apprehending him and securing him, in order to bring him to trial."
This article makes no exception of crimes committed by one soldier
upon another, nor of cases where there is concurrent jurisdiction
in the military courts. Tytler, in his work upon military law, says
"The martial or military law as contained in the mutiny act and
articles of war, does, in no respect, supersede or interfere with the
civil or municipal laws of the realm. * * * Soldiers are, equally
with all other classes of citizens, bound to the same strict observance
of the laws of the country and the fulfilment of all their social
duties, and are alike amenable to the ordinary civil and criminal
courts of the country for all offences against those laws and breaches
of those duties."
In the case of the United State's v. Cornell, 5 Mass. 61, 91, Mr.
Justice SToRY took cognisauce of a murder committed by one
soldier upon another, jn Fort Adams, Newport harbor. The case
was vigorously contested, and the point was made that the state
courts had jurisdiction of the offence, but there was no claim that
there was not jurisdiction in some civil tribunal. A like case was
that of a murder committed in .Fort Pulaski, at the mouth of the
Savannah river, and tried in 1872, before Mr. Justice WooDs and
Judge ERSKINE, 1 Woods 480. No question was raised as to the
jurisdiction. The subject of the civil responsibility of the army
was very carefully considered by Attorney-General Cushing, in
Steiner's Case, 6th Opinions 413, and the conclusion reached, that
an act criminal both by military and general law, is subject to be
tried either by a military or civil court, and that a conviction or
acquittal by the civil authorities of the offence against the general
law does not discharge from responsibility for the military offence
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involved in the same facts. The converse of this proposition is
equally true.
2. The character of the act involved in this case presents a more
serious question. The material facts are undisputed. There is no
doubt that the deceased was killed by the prisoner under the performance of a supposed obligation to prevent his escape by any
means in his power. There is no evidence that the prisoner fired
before the necessity for his doing so had become apparent. Stone
was called upon several times to halt, with a hail by the quartermaster-sergeant that there was "a load after him." Duff, his
nearest pursuer, was not gaining upon him, and in another halfminute he would have scaled the two fences between him and the
highway, and would probably have been lost in the houses that lie
on the other side of the street. A court of inquiry, called for the
purpose of fully investigating the circumstances, was of the opinion
that if Clark had not performed his duty as efficiently as he did,
by firing on deceased, he certainly would have effected his escape;
and found that no further action was necessary in the case. The
prisoner and the deceased had always been good friends, and it is
at least doubtful whether Clark recognised him at the time of firing
the fatal shot. The prisoner has heretofore borne a most excellent
reputation, was never court-martialed nor punished, and was pronounced by all the witnesses who testified upon the subject to be
an exceptionally good soldier. There is not the slightest reason to
suppose that he was not acting in obedience to what he believed to
be his duty in the premises. There was some conflicting testimony
as to whether he was standing or kneeling at the time he fired, but
I am not able to see its materiality. If he was authorized to shoot
at all, he was at liberty to take such position as would insure the
most accurate aim, whether his object was to hit the deceased in the
leg or in the body. Clark says that he aimed low for the purpose
.of merely disabling him, but owing to a sudden descent in the
ground, the shot took effect in the back instead of the leg. For
the purpose of this examination, however, I am bound to presume
that he intended to kill, as a man is always presumed to intend the
natural and probable consequences of his acts. The case, then,
reduces itself to the naked legal proposition, whether the prisoner
is excused in law in killing the deceased.
The general rule is well settled by elementary writers upon
criminal law, that an officer, having custody of a person charged
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with felony, may take his life, if it becomes absolutely necessary to
do so to prevent his escape; but he may not do this if he be charged
simply with a misdemeanor, the theory of the law being that it is
better that a misdemeanant escape than that human life be taken.
I doubt, however, whether this law would be strictly applicable at
the present day. Suppose, for example, a person was arrested for
petit larceny, which is a felony at the common law, might an officer
under any circumstances be justified in killing him? I think not..
The punishment is altogether too disproportioned to the magnitude
of the offence. Perhaps under the statute of this state, 2 How.
Stat. § 9430, wherein a felony is "construed to mean an offence for
which the offender, on conviction, shall be liable by law to be punished by death, or by imprisonment in the state prison," the principle might still be applied. If this statute were applicable to this
case it would operate as a justification, since Stone had been convicted and sentenced to hard labor in a military prison. Under the
recent case of Lx parte Wilson, 114 U. S. 417, it was adjudged by
the Supreme Court, upon full consideration, that a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term of years at hard labor, was an
"infamous crime," within the meaning of the constitution. Manifestly, however, the case must be determined by different considerations. Stone had been court-martialed for a military offence, in
which there is no distinction between felonies and misdemeanors.
His crime was one wholly unknown to the common law, and the
technical definitions of that law are manifestly inappropriate to
cases which are not contemplated in the discussion of common-law
writers upon the subject. We are bound to take a broader view,
and to measure the rights and liabilities of the prisoner by the
exigencies of the military service, and the circumstances of the particular case. It would be extremely unwise for the civil courts to
lay down general principles of law which would tend to impair the
efficiency of th6 military arm, or which *would seem to justify or
condone conduct prejudicial to good order and military discipline.
An army is a necessity, perhaps, I ought to say, an unfortunate
necessity, under every system of government, and no civilized state
in modern times has been able to dispense with one. To insure
efficiency an army must be to a certain extent a despotism. Each
officer, from the general to the corporal, is invested with an arbitrary
power over those beneath him, and the soldier who enlists in the
army waives, in some particulars, his rights as a civilian, surrenders
VOL. XXXV.-88
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his personal liberty during the term of his enlistment, and consents
to come and go at the will of his superior officers. He agrees to
become amenable to the military courts, to be disciplined for offences
unknown to the civil law, to relinquish his right to trial by jury,
and to receive punishments which, to the civilian, seem out of proportion to the magnitude of the offence. The articles of war, which
he takes an oath upon his enlistment to observe, are in fact a military code of Draconic severity, and authorize harsh punishments
fur offences which seem to be of a trivial nature. Thus, by the
articles of war all the following crimes are punishable by death, or
such other punishment as a court-martial may direct: Striking a
superior officer, drawing or lifting up a weapon, or offering any
violence against him, or disobeying any lawful command, art. 21.
Exciting or joining in any mutiny or sedition, art. 22. Failing to
use his utmost endeavors to suppress such mutiny or sedition, or
failing to give information thereof to his commanding officer, art.
23. A sentinel sleeping upon his post, or leaving it before he is
relieved, art. 39. Occasioning false alarms in camp or quarters,
art. 41. Misbehaving himself before the enemy. Running away
or shamefully abandoning any post which he is commanded to defend. Speaking words inducing others to do the like. Casting
away his arms or ammunition, or quitting his post or colors to
plunder or pillage, art. 42. Compelling the commander of any
post to surrender it to the enemy or to abandon it, art. 43. Making
known the watchword to any person not entitled to receive it, or
giving the watchword different from that which he has received, art.
44. Relieving the enemy with money, victuals, or ammunition, or
harboring or protecting an enemy, art. 45. Holding correspondence or giving intelligence to an enemy, art. 46. Deserting in time
of war, art. 47. Advising or persuading another to desert in time
of war, art. 51. Doing violence to any person bringing provisions or
other necessaries to camp or quarters of troops in foreign parts, art.
56. Forcing a safeguard in a foreign territory or during a rebellion, art. 57. Some of these articles are applicable only to a state
of war, but some of them treat of offences which may equally well
be committed in time of peace. Besides these, there are a number
of minor offences, punishable as a court-martial may direct, and a
general and very sweeping article, No. 62, providing that all crimes
not capital, and all disorders and neglects to the prejudice of good
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order and military discipline shall be justifiable by a courtm..,'tial,
and punishable at the discretion of the court.
Now, while the punishment in Stone's case seems to the civilian
quite disproportioned to the character of his offence, as charged in
the specifications, which was no more nor less than the utterance
of a malicious falsehood, when gauged by the penalties attached by
Congress to the several offences contained in the articles of war, it
does not seem so excessive; at any rate it was the lawful judgment
of a court having jurisdiction of his case, and it was his duty to*
abide by it, or pursue his remedy in the method provided by law.
In seeking to escape, the deceased was undoubtedly guilty of other
conduct prejudicial to good order and military discipline, and was
liable to such further punishment as a court-martial might inflict.
In suffering him to escape, the prisoner became amenable to Article
69, and failing to use his utmost endeavor to prevent it, was himself subject to such punishment as a court-martial might direct.
Did he exceed his authority in using his musket? I have made
the above citations from the military code to show that the commonlaw distinction between felonies and misdemeanors is of no possible
service in guaging the duty of a military guard with respect to a
soldier in the act of escaping. His position is more nearly analogous to that of an armed sentinel stationed upon the walls of a penitentiary to prevent the escape of convicts. The penitentiary-and
for this purpose we may use the house of correction in Detroit as
an example-may contain convicted murderers, felons of every
grade, as well as others charged with vagrancy or simple breaches
of the peace, and criminals of all descriptions between the two. If
the guard see one of those prisoners scaling the wall, and there be
no other means of arresting him, may he not fire upon him without
stopping to inquire whether he is a felon or a misdemeanant ? If
he prove to be a felon he will be fully justified; if he prove to be
a misdemeanant, is he therefore guilty of murder? There are undoubtedly cases where a person who has no malice in fact may be
charged with malice in law and held guilty of murder, through a
misapprehension of the law. Thus, if a sheriff charged with the
execution of a malefactor by hanging, should carry out the sentence
by shooting or beheading; or, commanded to hang upon a certain
day, should hang upon another day ; or if an unauthorized person
should execute the sentence, it would probably be murder at common law. But these cases are an exception to the general rule,
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that actual malice must exist to justify a conviction for murder.
While human life is sacred, and the man who takes it is held
strictly accountable for his act, a reputable citizen, who certainly
does not lose his character as such by enlisting in the army, ought
not to be branded as a murderer upon a mere technicality, unless
such technicality be so clear as to admit of no reasonable doubt.
Thus, if a sentinel stationed at the gate of a fort should wantonly
shoot down a civilian endeavoring to enter in the daytime, or an
officer should recklessly slay a soldier for some misconduct or breach
of discipline, no supposed obligation upon his part to do this would
excuse so gross an outrage.
In this connection it is argued by the defence that the finding
of the Court of Inquiry acquitting the prisoner of all blame, is a
complete bar to this prosecution. I do not so regard it. If the
civil courts have jurisdiction of murder, notwithstanding the concurrent jurisdiction by court-martial of military offences, it follows
logically that the proceedings in one cannot be pleaded as a bar to
proceedings in the other; and if the finding of such court should
conflict with the well-recognised principles of the civil law, I should
be compelled to disregard it: State v. Rankin, 4 Cold. 145. At
the same time, I think that weight should be given, and in a case
of this kind great weight, to the finding, as an expression of the
opinion of the military court, of the magnitude of Stone's offence,
and of the necessity of using a musket to prevent his escape. I
am the more impressed with this view from the difficulty of applying common-law principles to a case of this description. There is
a singular and almost total absence of authority upon the subject
of the power of a military guard in time of peace. But considering the nature of military government, and the necessity of main
taining good order and discipline in a camp, I should be loth to say
that life might not be taken in suppressing conduct prejudicial to
such discipline. In charging the jury in The U. S. v. Carr, 1
Woods 484, Mr. Justice WooDs instructed them to "inquire whether
at the moment he fired his piece at the deceased, with his surroundings at that time, he had reasanable ground to believe and-did
believe that the killing or serious wounding of the deceased was
necessary to the suppression of a munity then and there existing,
or of a disorder which threatened speedily to ripen into a mutiny.
If he had reasonable ground so to believe, and did so believe, then
the killing was not unlawful. * * * But it must be understood
that the law will not require an officer charged with the order and
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discipline of a camp or fort to weigh with scrupulous nicety the
amount of force necessary to suppress disorder. The exercise of a
reasonable discretion is all that is required." So, in the case of
Mc Call v. .XcDowell, 1 Abb. U. S. 212, 218, it is said, that "except in a plain case of excess of authority, where at first blush it
is apparent and palpable to the commonest understanding that the
order is illegal, I cannot but think that the law should excuse the
military subordinate when acting in obedience to the order of his
commander. Otherwise, he is placed in the dangerous dilemma of
being liable in damages to third persons for obedience to an order,
or to the loss of his commission and disgrace for disobedience
thereto. * * * The first duty of a soldier is obedience, and without this there can be neither discipline nor efficiency in the army.
If every subordinate officer and soldier were at liberty to question
the legality of the orders of the commander, and obey them or not
as they may consider them valid or invalid, the camp would be
turned into a debating school, where the precious moment for action
would be wasted in wordy conflicts between the advocates of conflicting opinions."
It is true, this was a civil case for false imprisonment, and these observations were made with reference to a
question of malice, which was material as bearing upon the plaintiff's right to punitory damages, as it is also a necessary ingredient
in the definition of murder.
The question of the civil responsibility of a naval officer (and
his criminal responsibility seems to be the same), was considered
by the Supreme Court in Wilkes v. Dinsman,7 How. 89, which was
an action of trespass against Commodore Wilkes for causing the
plaintiff to be whipped and imprisoned for disobedience of orders,
near the Sandwich Islands. In discussing the responsibility of the
commanding officer of a vessel of war, Mr. Justice WOODBURtY observed: " In respect to those compulsory duties, whether in reenlisting or detaining on board, or in punishing or imprisoning on
shore, while arduously endeavoring to perform them in such a
manner as might advance the science and conscience and glory of
his country, rather than his own personal designs, a public officer,
invested with certain discretionary powers, never has been, and
never should be, made answerable for any injury when acting within
the scope of his authority, and not influenced by malice, corruption
or cruelty.' * * * "The officer, being intrusted with a discretion
for public purposes, is not to be punished for the exercise of it,

UNITED STATES v. CLARK.

unless it is nrst proved against him, either that he exercised the
power confided to him in cases without his jurisdiction or in a
manner not confided to him, as, with malice, cruelty, wilful oppression, or, in the words of Lord MANSFIELD, that he exercised it as
'if the heart is wrong.' In short, it is not enough to show that
he committed an error in judgment, but it must have been a malicious and wilful error."
The same principle was applied in the criminal case of Biggs v.
State, 3 Cold. (Tenn.) 85. Riggs was a private soldier who had
been convicted of murder in killing a man while acting under the
orders of his superior officer. The court held that an order'illegal
in itself, and not justifiable by the rules and usages of war, so that
a man of ordinary sense and understanding would know when he
heard it read or given, that the order was illegal, would afford the
private no protection for a crime under such orders; but that an
order given by an officer to his private, which does not expressly
and clearly show on its face or the body thereof, its own illegality,
the soldier would be bound to obey, and such order would be a protection to him.
I have no doubt the same principle would apply to the acts of a
subordinate officer performed in compliance with his supposed duty
as a soldier; and unless the acu were manifestly beyond the scope
of his authority, or, in the words used in the above case, were such
that a man of ordinary sense and understanding would know that
it was illegal, that it would be a protection to him if he acted in
good faith and without malice. As there is no reason in this case
to suppose that Clark was not doing what he conceived to be his
duty, and the act was not so clearly illegal that a reasonable man
might not suppose it to be legal (indeed I incline to the opinion
that it was legal), and as there was an entire absence of malice, I
think he ought to be discharged.
But even if this case were decided upon common-law principles,
the result would not be different. By the statutes of the state in
which the homicide was committed, a felony is defined to be a crime
punishable by imprisonment in the state's prison. Stone had been
convicted of a military offence, and sentenced to hard labor in the
military prison for two years, and so far as the analogies of the
common law are applicable at all, he must be considered, in a case
of this kind, of having been convicted of a felony.
It may be said that it is a question for a jury in each case,
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whether the prisoner was justified by the circumstances in making
use of his musket, and if this were a jury trial, I should submit
that question to them; but as I am bound to find, as a matter of
fact, that there is not reasonable cause to believe the defendant
guilty not merely of a homicide, but of a felonious homicide; and
as I would, acting in another capacity, set aside a conviction, if a
verdict of guilty were rendered, I shall assume the responsibility
of directing his discharge.
The relation existing between the military and the civil power in the United
States is a matter of very grave import, in which not only the military and
the legal profession, but every citizen
of the republic, is directly interested.
The decision in the particular ease, involving as it does the relation existing
between the military and the civil power,
is one of remarkable interest, and is sure
to attract the very general attention of
the profession. It is also attracting the
attention of the military, as being one
of the most important decisions affecting
them ever decided in the civil coucts.
Crimes Committed by Persons in the
Military Service.-The law is, that if a
crime is committed by a person in the
military service of the United States,
neither a sheriff, nor any other state
officer, has a right to go to a company
or regiment, and, by virtue of state process, arrest any officer or soldier under
military control oi in actual military
service. Such a person can only be arrested in the manner provided by the
Articles of War.
In Article 59, it is provided that when
any officer or soldier is accused of any
crime which "is punishable by the laws
of the land," it shall be the duty of the
military authorities, except in time of
war, "upon application duly made by
or in behalf of the party injured, to use
their utmost endeavors to deliver him
(the person accused) over to the civil
magistrate, and to aid the officers of justice in apprehending and securing him in
order to bring him to trial." This ar-

ticle was construed in the famous case of
Ex parte fcRoberts, 10 Ia. 600 (1864),
and it was then held that while a person
in actual military service could only be
arrested on the process of a state court in
the manner pointed out in the article, yet
a soldier on furlough, not being in actual
service, might he arrested on such process. It appears that Article 59 was
originally derived from a corresponding
British article.
When a crime is committed by a person in the military service, it is understood to be necessary under Article 59 :
I. That the officer or soldier commitbetingthe crime should be "accused"
fore a civil magistrate.
2. That the accusation should be of a
crime "punishable by the laws of the
land." And in commenting on this
Colonel Winthrop, Judge Advocate
General, in his work on Military Law,
"
vol. 1, p. 996, says :
When the crime
or offence of the officer or soldier was
committed within a military reservation
or other locality, over which, by the cession of its jurisdiction by the state or
otherwise, exclusive jurisdiction is vested
in the United States, the article does not
apply; the criminal act not being one
'punishable by the laws of the land,' as
the term is there employed. In such a
case, if deemed expedient that the accused be tried by a civil tribunal, the
military authorities will concur with the
U. S. marshal and district attorney with
a view to his trial before the U. S. Dis-

trict Court."
3. That an appiication be duly made
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by or on behalf of the party injured to
the military authorities for the surrender
of the accused. And this application is
a "necessary antecedent condition" of
the right of the civil authorities to act:
Opins. Att.-Gen. 421.
4. When an officer or soldier has become chargeable with a misdemeanor or
disorderly conduct in violation of a city
ordinance, it appears that he may be apprehended when found, and tried and
punished, without previous recourse to
the military authorities: 1 Winthrop's
3:Iilitary Law, p. 999.
Under Article 58 authority is conferred
on courts-martial, in time of war, to take
jurisdiction over certain specified crimes
committed by the military, whether such
crimes directly prejudice military discipline or affect the military service.
The crimes designated by the article are
those of murder, manslaughter, mayhem, rape, robbery. arson, burglary,
larceny, assault and battery with intent
to kill or with intent to commit rape.
This article was construed by the Supreme Court of the United States in
Coleman v. Tennessee, 97 U. S. 509
(1878), and it was held not to make the
jurisdiction of the military tribunals exclusive of that of the state courts. The
case is a very interesting one, and the
opinion of the court sets forth certain
important principles.
It shows:
1. That a foreign army, permitted to
march through a friendly country, or to
be stationed in it by permission of its
government, is exempt from the civil
and criminal jurisdiction of the place.
(And see the celebrated case of The
Exchange, 7 Cranch 139 (1812).
2. That when the armies of the United
States were in the territory of the insurgent states, they were not subject, for
crimes committed, to the laws of the
enemy, or amenable to his tribunals.
They were answerable only to their own
government; and only by its laws, as

enforced by its armies, could they be
punished.
3. When the armies of the United
States were in states occupying their
normal and constitutional relations to
the federal government, and in which
the civil courts were open and in the
undisturbed exercise of their jurisdiction, they were delivered over to the
state courts for trial.
4. By the enactment of Article 58 jurisdiction over such offences was also
given to the military tribunals, but this
jurisdiction is not exclusive of that of
the state courts.
In holding that this jurisdiction is
concurrent, and not exclusive, the courts
say :
"Previous to its enactment, the offences designated were punishable by the
state courts, and persons in the military
service who committed them were deli; and
vered over to those courts for'trial
it contains no words indicating an intention on the part of Congress to take from
them the jurisdiction in this respect
which they had always exercised. With
the known hostility of the American
people to any interference by the military with the regular administration of
justice in the civil courts, no such intention should be ascribed to Congress in
the absence of clear and direct language
to that effect." And the ccurt goes on
to intimate that Congress, if it saw fit to
do so, might confer exclusive jurisdiction
upon the military courts over offences
committed by persons in the military
service of the United States, its power
being plenary over persons in its military
service.
Criminal Jurisdiction of Federal
Courts.-It is elementary law, known
by all, that the federal 'courts do not
possess a common-law jurisdiction over
crimes. Those courts cannot take jurisdiction of a criminal case, except as that
jurisdiction is conferred byact of Congress. On the other hand, the states can
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punish all offences committed within
their territorial boundaries, excepting
only offences committed in places over
which their jurisdiction is ousted by some
provision of the constitution of the
United States, or by some provision in
the act admitting the state into the
Union, whereby the United States has
reserved exclusive jurisdiction over
some portion of territory reserved for its
own purposes.
The constitution of the United States
confers on the Congress the right to exercise exclusive authority "over all places
purchased by the authority of the legislature of the state in which the same shall
be, for the erection of forts, magazines,
arsenals, dockyards and other needful
buildings. When an offence has been
committed in one of the places above
designated, the question has been raised,
whether the state courts have a right to
punish the offender, or whether jurisdiction over offences so committed is exclusively in the courts of the United States,
by virtue of the provision above referred
to. In the case of United States v.
Cornell, 5 Mason 61, 91 (1819), Mr.
Justice STORY held that the purchase of
lands by the United States for public
purposes, within the territorial limits of
a state, did not of itself oust the jurisdiction of such state over such lands;
but when the legislature of the state gave
its consent to the purchase the state
thereby relinquished its authority over
the land, and the jurisdiction of the
United States became complete and
exclusive. Its jurisdiction is exclusive,
because "exclusive jurisdiction is," as
Justice SToRY says, "the attendant upon
exclusive legislation," and the latter, as
we have above pointed out, is vested by
the constitution in the Congress. That
the jurisdiction of the United States is
exclusive over offences so committed, see
State v. Kelly, 76 Me. 331 (1884),
which is the most recent case on the
subject, expressly ruling the point in
question.
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An interesting question has arisen as
to the jurisdiction over Indians committing crimes while living in tribal relations on Indian reservations within state
limits. In State v. Doxtater, 47 Wise.
278 (1879), the Supreme Court of Wisconsin affirms the right of the state courts
to punish offences committed by Indians
on their reservations within the state. It
declares that the jurisdiction, when not
restricted by existing treaties made with
the tribes, or by the act admitting the
state into the Union, is supreme over the
subject, and extends to all persons and
places within the state. And see to the
same effect the following cases referred
to in that decision : Unied States v. Bailey, I McLean 234 (1834); UnitedStates
v. Cisna, Id. 254 (1835); United States
v. Sa-coo-da-cot, I Abbott U. S. Cir. Ct.
377 (1870); Goodell v. Jackson, 20
Johns. 693 (1823) ; Murray's Case, 17
Wend. 531 (1837) ; Peters' Case, 2
Johns. Cas. 344 (1801) ; Clay v. State,
4 K3.an. 49 (1866) ; Hlicks v. Ew-har-tonal, 21 Ark. 106 (1860); People v. Antonio, 27 Cal. 404 (1865); United States
v. Stahl, 1 Woolworth C. C. R. 192
(1866); Statev. Foreman, 8 Yerger 256
(1835); United Statesv. Rogers, 4 How.
567 (1846); Caldwell v. State, I Stew. &
Port. 327 (1832); State v. Tassels, Dudley (Ga.) 229 (1830).
But the case recently decided in the
Supreme Court of tile United StatesUnited States v. Kagana, 118 U. S. 375
(1886)-has put an end to the controversy on this subject. That case declares that the federal courts have junsdiction over ofihnces committed by
Indians on their reservations, while they
are living in their tribal relations, even
though those reservations may be within
state limits, and that the Indian living
in his tribal relations is not subject to the
power of the state courts. But the court
does not deny that the process of state
courts runs within such reservations, and
that state courts would have jurisdiction
over offences committed by white people
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found within the limits of the reservation.
JustifiableHomicide.-The books classify homicide under three heads: 1.
Homicide is justifiable when committed
under a command of the- law, in obedience to the mandate of the law. 2.
It is excusable when committed by misadventure, or se defendendo, under circumstances of such a nature that the law
excuses the taking of human life. 3. All
other homicides are termed felonies.
In the particular case the accused person claimed that the life of the deceased
was taken in obedience to the mandate
of the law military, which made it his
duty, as the guard of the military prison, to prevent the escape of the convict.
So far as common-law crimes are concerned, it is certainly well understood to
be the law, that an officer is justified in
taking the life of one guilty of felony, if
his escape cannot otherwise be prevented.
And it is equally well understood that he
has no right to take the life of one simply
guilty of a misdemeanor, even if an escape cannot be otherwise prevented.
The rule appears to be so stated in all
the text-books, and yet there seem to be
very few cases in which the courts have
expressly ruled the point. See Renau
v. State, 2 Lea (Tenn.) 720 (1879).
Under the facts existing in the particular case, two questions may well be
considered. Upon the principles of the
common law was the accused justified in
taking the life of the deceased ? This
question we should answer in the negative. The offence for which the deceased
was shot was not a felony at the common
law, and therefore by the common law
there was no right to take his life to
prevent his escape. The fact that the
offence was unknown to the common law,
and therefore neither a felony nor a misdemeanor, cannot alter the principle.
The principle is that the right to take
life, to prevent an escape, did not attach
except in cases of treason and felony,
and the offence in this case was neither.

We cannot refrain from calling attention to the fact that in the opinion
in the particular case the learned
judge doubts whether the commonlaw principle, that an officer having
the custody of a prisoner charged with
felony, may take the life of the prisoner
when necessary to prevent his escape,
would be applied at the present day in
the case of one arrested for petit larceny,
which was a felony at common law, adding: "Perhaps under the statutes of
this state (Michigan) wherein a felony
is ' construed to mean an offence for which
the offender, on conviction, shall be liable by law to be punished by death, or by
imprisonment in the state prison,' the
principle might still be applied." In
connection with this remark, we submit
the following observation.
The statutes of Michigan do declare
that when the word felony is used in
any statute in this state, it shall be
construed in the manner above stated.
And a similar provision may be
found in the statutes of other states.
The question is, how do such provisions
affect those offences which at common
law were felonies, but under the statutes
are not punishable by death or by imprisonment in a state prison ?
This question was raised in Drennan
v. People, 10 Mich. 169 (1862), and it
was decided that the provision referred
to did not abrogate the common-law
felonies, and that those acts which were
felonies at the common law still remain
such, "in the same manner as if this
statute definition had never been adopted ;" and that " this statute definition
does not necessarily make all offences
which are punishable with death or by
imprisonment in the state prison, felonious, to all intents and purposes ;" that
the definition "can have the effect only
to make them felonies within this statute
definition, and to the extent, and with
the incidents and consequences, indicated
by the respective sections or provisions
of the statute referred to where the term
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felony is thus used; though there may
be strong reasons, for the sake of uniformity and by analogy, to the commonlaw felonies, to consider them as drawing after them the usual incidents of the
latter."
Now, there is a very important principle involved in all this. In Michigan,
larceny to an amount under twenty-five
dollars is not a felony, under the statutes,
because not punishable with death or by
imprisonment in the state prison. In
Drennan'sCase, supra. an officer without

a warrant attempted to arrest a person
charged with larceny to the amount of
one dollar and fifty cents, and in resist-

ing the arrest the prisoner took the officer's life. The court held that larceny
to the amount named being a felony at
common law, it still remained such notwithstanding the statute, and that therefore the common-law incident. of the
right to arrest without a warrant still
remained as a justification to the officer.
And this was followed in People v. Wilson, 55 Mich. 506 (1885). If Drennan's
Case was correctly decided, the commonlaw incident of the right to take life to
prevent the escape of one arrested for a
petty larceny, must still remain, unless
the courts are to abrogate it by an exercise of their legislative power, so much
denounced by Jeremy Bentham. Will
the courts exercise this power when a
case arises? The opinion in the particular case seems to imply that they should.
But whether they would or would not is
uncertain ; and the case affords an illustration of that uncertainty in the law,
due to the "legislative power" of the
courts, which is leading so many to the
opinion that it would be well to codify
the law and strip the courts of their power
to enact "judge-made" law. We would
not be understood as expressing the
opinion that "judge-made" law is an
unmitigated evil and ought to be abolished. We do not care to express an
opinion on that point in this connection.
Others will see in this very Illustration
how admirable it is that the courts should

possess this very power, in order to prevent injustice and properly administer
justice between man and man.
But to return from this digression.
We have said that there were two questions which might properly be considered
in this particular case. The first question we have answered in the negative
by saying that tested by the common
law, putting one side the law military,
the accused was probably not justified in
taking the life of the deceased. This,
however, does not dispose of the case, for
the second question remains : Was the
accused justified by the law military ?
This question must be answered, as the
alleged offence was committed by one
soldier on another soldier, both being in
military service, and the one acting, as
he alleges, in obedience to military law.
If by the law military a sentinel is under
obligations to prevent an escape of a
military convict by taking the life of the
one making his escape, then no civil
court would be justified in condemning
such sentinel to death. The possession
of such a power by a civil court would
place a military sentinel in this worse
than absurd position. If he failed to
take the life of an escaping military convict a military court, possessing jurisdiction of his case, might condemn him to
death for failure to perform his military
duty : while, on the other hand, if be did
take the life of the escaping convict, he
avoided death under the sentence of a
military court, only to encounter it on
the scaffold under the sentence of a civil
court. Of course such a state of things
cannot be.
It will be noticed that in the particular case the learned judge does not
decide that a sentinel of a military prison
has a legal right to take the life of an
escaping convict, when that is necessary
to prevent the escape. He says: "I
incline to the opinion that it was legal,"
for the accused to take the life of the deceased who was attempting an escape;
but he does not so decide. The prisoner
was discharged because at the time he
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killed the deceased he was engaged in
the performance of a supposed obligation, and the act was not so clearly illegal that a reasonable man might not
suppose it to be legal.
As a general rule, a mistake of law is
no defence. In People v. Cook, 39 Mich.
236 (1878), (a case of homicide), the
court declare: "The deception or delusion under which he labored was not one
of fact but of law, in supposing that
he had a right to take life under the circumstances. This fully accounts for his
action in the premises, but would not
justify, excuse or exonerate him from
the legal consequences of the act committed;" The defendant in the above
case took the life of the deceased under a
belief that the latter was using fraudulent but not forcible means to accomplish the seduction of his sister, and that
the law allowed him to take life in defence of her chastity. And if a foreigner,
unacquainted with the law of this country, should kill a person in a duel, his
act would be none the less murder, although he might have supposed it to be
lawful. See Ex parte Barronet, I E. &
B. 1 (1852).
If a police officer shoots an escaping
prisoner his act is excused if the person
killed was a felon; but if he was only a
misdemeanaut, his act is murder. Is
there any authority for saying that the
character of the act in such a case depends on whether the officer in shooting
the misdemeanant mistook his legal
rights, and killed, supposing the law
authorized him to prevent an escape at
all hazards? We nowhere find it so
stated. He is conclusively presumed to
know what the law authorizes and what
it forbids, and his guilt or innocence
turns on the single question, whether the
law justified or not the shooting of a misdemeanant to prevent an escape.
Is there a different principle to be applied to the case of a sentinel of a military prison, who in time of peace takes
the life of an escaping prisoner? The
decision in the particular case seems to

so rule. And if so, is there any sufficient reason in law for making such a
distinction ? Should not life be as sacred
in the hands of one as in the hands of
the other? And if the one is required
to know the law, why should not the
other also ? The decision in this particular case does not answer these questions, but falls back upon the authori.ty
of .Riggs v. State, supra, in which it was
held that a soldier acting under the command of a superior officer was excused
from criminal liability, notwithstanding
the illegality of the order, provided the
order was not on its face so apparently
illegal that a man of ordinary sense and
understanding would know when he
heard it read or given that the order
was illegal. And such would seem to
be a very proper conclusion. A command of an officer in the military service
to a subordinate sworn to instantly obey
his orders, should, if its illegality is not
apparent on its face, be a protection to
the subordinate who acts in reliance on
it, on the same principle that a warrant
issued by a magistrate is a protection to
a sheriff or constable who acts under it,
provided the warrant is on its face regular and legal.
But ought the principle enunciated in
Riggs v. State, supra, be extended so as
to excuse a soldier in time of peace who
is not acting under the command of an
officer, but acts on his own motion, and
on his own idea of what the law allows
or commands ? Does he stand on any
different plane from that on which a
sheriff or constable stands when they
assume to act on their own responsibility
and Nithout a warrant? There are no
cases in the books, so far as I have been
able to investigate the matter, which
answers this important question. And
it is for this reason that the decision in
the particular case is so very important,
as stated in the beginning of this note.
But whether or not a soldier, acting
on his own responsibility and not upon
the direct command of his superior,
should be excused from criminal responsi-
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bility because he has acted in good faith
and under a misapprehension of what
his duty required, we have but little
doubt that the prisoner in the particular
case was properly discharged. The acts
of Congress and articles of war made it
incumbent on him to prevent the escape,
and he had a legal right to employ so
much force as was necessary to perform
that duty. This was the opinion of the
military court which tried the accused
and discharged him. It seems to be the
opinion of the federal judge writing the
opinion in the particular case. And the
writer of this note sees no escape from
such a conclusion. If it seems harsh,
cruel and unjust that a military convict
should thus lose his life, we can only call
attention to the list of offences, enumerated in the opinion of the court in the
particular case. the penalty for which is
death under the military law.
Crimes Committed by Another's Command.-We shall conclude this note by a
brief statement of the law as to criminal
liability in the case of crimes committed
by another's command. The law is well
settled that when a homicide is committed
by one acting under the unlawful command of another, the command does not
excuse the act, the actor being liable as
though no command had been given.
I. We may take the case of husband
and wife. It is in general true that if
a married woman commits a crime under
the coercion of her husband, the act in
her is excused by virtue of tlhe coercion.
But this principle is not carried so far as
to excuse her from criminal liability
when she commits a homicide in the
presence of and under the coercion of
her husband. Stephen's Dig. of Cr.
Law, art. 30.
2. So in the case of parent and cbild,
it is argued that the command of the
parent will not excuse the child from
criminal liability for act done in obedience to the command. 1 Bishop on Cr.
Law, . 367 ; Penple v. RMchmond, 29
Cal. 414 (1866).

3. And in the case of master and servant the same principle is again applied,
the servant being liable notwithstanding
the command.
Com. v. Drew, 3 Cush.
Blass. 279 (1849).
4. In the case of a soldier acting under
the command of a superior officer, the
law as stated by Mr. Bishop is as follows : "The command of a superior to
an inferior, as of a military officer to a
subordinate, * * * will not justify a
criminal act done in pursuance of it :"
1 Bishop on Cr. Law 355.
In the case of Mitchell v. Harmon: 13
How. 129 (1851), the Supreme Court
of the United States decided that a military officer could not rely on an apparently unlawful order of his superior, as
a justification. If such a command could
not be a justification in a civil case, and
the case in which the point was ruled it
will be observed was a civil case, it certainly could not constitute a justification
in a criminal case, where this principle
would have to be more strictly applied.
That a soldier is not justified in obeying
an unlawful command of a superior, and
is liable criminally notwithstanding the
command, is laid down in Biggs v. State,
3 Cold. (Tenn.) 85 (1866) ; U. S. v.
C'arr, 1 Woods U. S. C. C. 480 (1872).
In the case last cited, Mr. Justice WOODS
instructed the jury as follows: "Nor
will any order of a superior officer to an
inferior in rank justify the wilful killing
of a person under the peace and protection of the law. A soldier is bound to
obey only the lawful orders of his superiors. .If he receives an order to do an
unlawful act, he is bound neither by his
duty nor his oath to do it. So far from
such an order being a justification, it
makes the party giving the order an accomplice in the crime.
For instance, an
order from an officer to a soldier to shoot
another for disrespectful words merely,
would, if obeyed, be murder both in the
officer and soldier."
HEnRTy WADE ROGERS.
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Court of Appeals of Maryland.
ADAMS v. BEALL.
Where money is paid by a minor in consideration of being admitted as a partner
in the business of an adult, and he does become and remain a partner for a given
time, he cannot, on voluntarily withdrawing from the partnership, recover back the
money thus paid, unless le was induced to enter into the partnership by the fraudulent representations of the adult.
It seems that where the contract entered into by a minor is of a personal nature,
or relates to personal property, it may be avoided by him either before or after his
majority.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Baltimore City Court, in favor
of plaintiff, in an action to recover back money paid by an infant.
Albert Ritchie, and Marshall &"Hall, for appellant.
William Colton, for appellee.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
ROBINSON, J.-The appellee, while a minor, paid to the appellant $2900, as a consideration for being admitted as a partner in
the appellant's business. The partnership continued for more than
a year, and finding it unprofitable, the appellee, without formally
dissolving the partnership, withdrew from the business.
The question in the case is whether the appellee is entitled to
recover of the appellant the money thus paid ? His right to disaffirm the partnership contract and to avoid all liabilities under it,
including the partnership debts, is not denied. Being an infant
when the contract was made, this is a privilege to which, for his
protection, he is entitled. But when he seeks to recover money
paid for a consideration which he has enjoyed, or has had the benefit of, this presents quite another question. The $2900 was paid
to the appellant in consideration of being admitted as a paitner in
his business. He was admitted as a partner, and continued to be
a member of the firm for at least a year. The business was not, it
is true, a successful one ; but this, in the absence of fraudulent
representations on the part of the appellant, cannot affect the question. We are dealing with a contract between an infant and an
adult, executed on both sides, and upon the faith of which money
was paid by the infant for a consideration which he has enjoyed.
The privilege of infancy, says Lord MANSFIELD, in Zouch v.
Parsons, 3 Burr. 1804, was intended as a shield or protection to
the infant, and not to be used as the instrument of fraud and injus-
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tice to others; and to hold that an infant has the right not only to
withdraw from a partnership at his own pleasure, and to subject
the adult partner to the payment of all the partnership debts, but
has the right also to recover money paid by him as a consideration
for being admitted into the partnership would be, it seems to us, to
extend the privilege beyond any just principles upon which it is
founded.
So long ago as Brawner v. Franklin,4 Gill 463, it was held
that where an infant advances money upon a contract, he. cannot
disaffirm the contract and recover the money advanced, if he has
enjoyed the consideration for which the money was paid.
H7olmes v. Bloqg, 8 Taunt. 508, is to the same effect. There the
infant paid a sum of money as his share of the consideration for a
lease of premises in which he and his partner carried on the businessof shoemaking. They occupied the premises from March until
June, when the infant dissolved the partnership, and brought an
action to recover back the money he had paid the lessor for his
lease. GTBBS, 0. J., said : " He may, it is true, avoid the lease ;
he may escape the burthen of the rent, and avoid the covenants,
but that is all he can do. He cannot, by putting an end to the
lease, recover back any consideration which he has paid for it; the
law does not enable him to do that."
It is a mistake to suppose that the principle on which this case
was decided was either overruled or even questioned in Corpe v.
Overton, 10 Bing. 252. In the latter case, the plaintiff while an
infant signed an agreement to enter into partnership with the
defendant, and to pay him 10001. for a share in the business; and
to execute on the 1st day of January a partnership deed with the
usual covenant. He also paid 1001. as a deposit for the fulfilment
of his part of the contract. The plaintiff afterwards disaffirmed
the partnership contract, and never did in fact become a partner.
The suit was brought to recover of the defendant the 1001. paid by
the infant as a deposit.
TINDAL, 0. J., said the case was distinguishable from Holmes
v. Blogg; in that case the plaintiff and partner occupied the
premises from Mlarch until June, and the money was paid for something available, that is, for three months' enjoyment of the premises. In the present case the plaintiff paid to Overton 1001. for
which he has not received the slightest consideration. The money
was paid either with a view to a present or a future partnership.
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I understand it as having been paid with a view to a future partnership. Now the partnership was not to be entered into till January,
1833, and the meanwhile the infant has derived no advantage
whatever from the contract."
BOSANQUET, J., " We are far from impeaching the judgment of

the court in Eolmes v. Blogg, as applicable to the facts of that case.
* * * Here the infant has derived no benefit whatever from the
contract, the consideration of which has wholly failed. * * * The
1001. paid here was in the nature of a deposit; money paid on a
deposit may generally be recovered back where the contract goes
off, and here the contract was defeated before the infant derived
any benefit from it."
ALDERSON and GASELEE, JJ., were of the same opinion.
The plaintiff was allowed to recover the deposit money paid by
him while an infant, because the partnership contract was disaffirmed by Corpe before the time agreed upon for it to begin. As
was said by ALDERSON, J., "Before the contract is performed, one
of the parties revokes it, and remits the other to the same situation
as if the contract had never been made."
The distinction between H7olmes v. Blog.q and Corye v. Overton,
is this: in the former the plaintiff was not allowed to recover the
money paid by him while an infant, because it was paid on a consideration which he had in part enjoyed; while in the latter, the
plaintiff was allowed to recover as upon an entire failure of consideration.
Passing then from these cases we come to .Exparte Taylor, v
DeG., M. & G. 254, which is a case directly in point. There an
infant paid a premium on entering into a partnership, and before
he came of age disaffirmed the contract, and upon the bankruptcy
of the firm attempted to prove for the premium thus paid.- Lord
Justice KNIGHT BRUCE said: "In my opinion a case of fraud has
not been established. That being so, the matter remains one of a
contract fairly made or as fairly made as a contract with an infant
could be made-a contract upon which the infant acted during his
minority and which during the minority has been in part performed
on each side. In such a state of things I conceive that if the
bankrupts had continued solvent, and an action had been brought
against them by the minor, either before or after majority, for the
purpose as recovering the money in question, or any part of it,
there must have been either a nonsuit or a verdict against him."
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Lord Justice TURNER said : "It is clear that an infant cannot
be absolutely bound by a contract entered into during his minority.
He must have a right upon his attaining his majority to elect
whether he will adopt the contract or not. It is, however, a different question whether, if an infant pays money on the footing of
a contract, he can afterwards recover it back. If an infant buys
an article which is not a necessary, he cannot be compelled to pay
for it; but if he does pay for it during his minority he cannot on.
attaining his majority recover the money back."
We have quoted at length from the preceding cases, because the
question at issue is an important one, and comes before us for the
first time for decision. And while fully recognising the privilege
which the law accords to minors in regard to contracts made during
their minority, yet in a case like the present, where money is paid
by a minor in consideration of being admitted as a partner in the
business of the appellant, and he does become and remain a partner for a given time, he ought not to be allowed to recover back the
money thus paid, unless he was induced to enter into the partnership
by the fraudulent representations of the appellant.
Whether an infant can avoid a contract and sue thereon during
his minority, or must wait until he arrives at age is a question
about which the decisions are conflicting. To hold that he cannot
disaffirm a voidable contract until he attains his majority would in
many cases work the greatest injustice to an infant; and where the
contract is of a personal nature, or relating to personal property,
we see no good reason why such a contract may not be avoided
either before or after his majority. Stafford v. Boot, 9 Cow. 626 ;
Shipman v. Horton, 17 Conn. 481; Willis v. Twambj, 13 Mass.
204.
The court having erred in granting the plaintiff's first and second
prayers the judgment must be reversed.
Judgment reversed and new trial awarded.
Questions as to the right of an infant
to disaffirm a contract entered into by
him with an adult, may arise in four
classes of cases, namely
1. contracts
executory on both sides ; 2. contracts
executed on the side of the infant; 3.
contracts executed on the side of the
adult, and 4. contracts executed in whole
or in part on both sides:
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1. Where the contract is wholly executory on both sides there is no doubt
but that the infant may avoid his contract and cancel the obligation of the
contract.
2. Where the contract has been executed in whole or in part on the side of
the infant, but has not been executed by
the adult, and the infant disaffirms the
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contract, having received no consideration or benefit thereunder, he may sue
for and recover the consideration moving
from him by any appropriate action, as
though no special contract had been
made: Medbury v. Watrous, 7 Hill
110; Corpe v. Overton, 10 Bing. 252;
Millard v. Hewlett, 19 Wend. 301 ;
Robinson v. Weeks, 56 Me. 102. The
dictum in Holmes v. Blogg, that, if an infant pays money with his own hand
without a valuable consideration he cannot get it back again, may be considered
as overruled. Besides the above cases,
see Riley v. lallory, 33 Coo. 207;
Heath v. Stevens, 48 N. H. 252 ; 1 Am.
Lead. Cas. (4th ed.) 259.
3. Where the contract has been executed in whole or in part on the side of
the adult, but remains executory on the
part of the infant, it is quite clear that it
may be disaffirmed by the infant, as in
other cases; but on principle it seems
clear that in such case, at least where he
has reached majority, he must return to
the adult the consideration if remaining
in specie in his possession or control and
capable of return; but, where articles
other than necessaries have been supplied
to the infant, and have been consumed
or parted with, or money lent is expended, the consideration in such case
being incapable of return, the adult is
remediless. See Smith v. Evans, 5 Hump.
73; Brawner v. Franklyn, 4 Gill 470;
Boodey v. M[cKenney, 23 Me. 525 ; Carey
v. Burton, 32 Mich. 30, and the cases
hereinafter cited.
4.Where the contract has been executed
'in whole or in part on both sides there is
more difficulty. The policy of the law
seems to be to require the infant, upon
disaffirmance, to place the adult in statu
quo as far as possible consistently with
the preservation of his privilege, which
is designed as a shield but not as a sword;
but the protection of an infant is the
main object, and the other seems to be
secondary in importance, and must yield
when its exercise is inconsistent with the

former. Accordingly, when the infant
elects to disaffirm his voidable contract,
he must disaffirm in toto as well that
portion which is to his advantage as that
which is onerous to him: Hubbard v.
Cummings, I Me. 1I ; Heath v. West,
28 N. H. 108; Bigelow v. Kenney, 3
Vt. 353 ; Weed v. Beebe, 21 Id. 495
Lynde v. Budd, 2 Paige Ch. 191;
Young v. McKee, 13 Mich. 556; Cogley v. Cushman, 16 Minn. 402 ; Skinner
v. Maxwell, 66 N. C. 45.
It also seems well settled, that if the
infant rescinds his contract and seeks to
reclaim the consideration moving from
him, he must restore the consideration
received by him if in his possession or
control, and that on tendering back such
consideration he is entitled to recovery :
Carr v. Clough, 26 N. H. 280; Price
v. Furman, 27 Vt. 268; Riley v.
Mallory, 33 Conn. 201 ; Robinson v.
Weeks, 56 Me. 102.
Some of the cases lay down the
doctrine generally that he must return
the consideration without any qualification whatever as to whether in his possession or not: Holmes v. Blogg, 8
Taunt. 508 ; Cummings v. Powell, 8
Tex. 93; Kerr v. Bell, 44 Mo. 125 ;
Taft v. Pike, 14 Vt. 409 ; or that, where
that cannot be done, he must place the
other party in as good a condition as
though he had returned the consideration,
or must account for the value of it before
he can recover back the consideration
given by him: Bailey v. Barnberger, 11
B. Mon. 113; Bartlwlomew v. Finnemore, 17 Barb. 430 ; Locke v. Smith, 41
N. H. 346; or that, when he seeks
relief in equity he must, as a condition
of relief, do equity to the other party by
restoring or accounting for the consideration : Prout v. Wiley, 28 Mich. 168;
per ChRISTONCY, J.; Miles v. Linger-

man, 24 Ind. 487, per RAr, J. ; Manning v. .Tohnson, 26 Ala. 451, per CHILTON, C. J. ; Hillyer v. Bennett, 3 Edw.
Ch. 222; Smith v. Evans, 5 Humph. 70.
The doctrine laid down in Holmes v.
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Blogg, as explained in Corpe v. Overton,
seems to he, that in such cases where the
infant has received a benefit under the
contract, he cannot rescind the contract
and recover back the consideration moving from him to the adult, unless the
adult can be placed in stati quo, a proposition which, if given full effect, will, in
the majority of cases where the infant has
received any benefit whatever under the
contract, deny to him all the protection
of his privilege, and instead, afford
ample protection to the adult who, if he
must be placed in statu quo before the
privilege is allowed to be exercised, incurs no risk whatever in contracting with
the infant.
The true doctrine, as it seems to us,
is that where the infant disaffirms his
executed contract after arriving at age,
and seeks a recovery of the consideration
moving from him, and where the specific
consideration received by him remains in
his hands in specie at the time of disaffirmance, and is capable of return, it
must be returned by him; but if he has,
during infancy, wasted, sold, or otherwise disposed of or ceased to possess the
consideration, and has none of it in his
hands in kind on arriving at majority,
he is not liable therefor, and may disaffirm without tendering or accounting for
such consideration: Price v. FRanan, 27
Vt. 268 ; Mustardv. Woldford, 15 Gratt.
329 ; Walsh v. Younq, 110 Blass. 399 ;
Manning v. Johnson, 26 Ala. 452; Carpenter v. Carpenter, 45 Ind. 143. See
also Ewell's Lead. Cas. 126, and cases
there cited.
In the case of Page v. 31orse, 128
Blass. 99, it was held that when an infant becomes a partner with another,
puts money into the business under an
agreement to share in the profits, and
does work for the firm, he cannot afterwards, by rescinding the contract, recover from his partner the money so paid
or for the labor performed, in the absence

*of an express promise to pay him therefor. But in this case, the money paid
was not a premium for admission, and
it did not appear that the money so paid
into the business by the infant was ever
in the separate hand or control of his
partner, and must be taken, therefore, to
have been like other property of the
partnership, in the possession of the two
jointly.
In the case of Sparmann v. Keim, 83
N. Y. 245, it was held, that upon the
rescission by an infant of his agreement
of partnership, he might recover back
his investments therein, less the amount
received from the firm. In this case, however, there were allegations in the complaint, that the infant was induced to
become a partner and make his investments, by the false and exaggerated
representations of the defendant as to
the profitable nature of the business.
The court, however, does not seem to

put its decision upon the ground of fraud,
but upon the general ground that the
contract was a voidable contract under
which the infant had received no benefit
except certain sums received by him out
of the business, which he offered to credit
on his claim, and therefore that he had
no right of rescission.
We have not been able to find a case
other than the case of Corpe v. Overton,
precisely like the principal case ; but
from the best consideration we have been
able to give it (the principal case), it
seems to us that by the weight of American authority, at least, and upon principle, the infant ought, in this case, to
have been allowed to recover. It must
be admitted, however, that the question
is one involved in considerable conflict,
and that there is a very respectable
amount of authority in favor of the decision of the court in the principal case.
M. D. EwaL.
Chicago.
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Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts.
LOWELL

ET AL.

v. STRAHAN.

(Two cases.)

A lease of the first floor of a building includes the front wall of that part of the
building, as parcel of the leased premises, and gives the lessee not merely a privilege or easement appurtenant to the building to use the wall for certain purposes,
such as putting out signs, but the right to the exclusive use thereof.
An agreement made by a lessee with a third person, to allow the business sign of
the latter to remain upon the outside wall of the leased premises, in consideration
of an annual payment, is a license, and not a lease, and does not constitute a breach
of a covenant against underletting.

THE first of these cases was an action for money had and received, brought against the defendant by the owners of a building
on the corner of Washington and Franklin streets, in Boston. The
second case was an action for the breach of covenant to keep in
repair, and not to underlet or make alterations and additions, contained in a lease, "of the first floor and front part of the basement
in" the same building; "being same premises last occupied by John
G. Calrow."
The second action was brought by the lessor (one
of the plaintiffs in the first action) against the same defendant, as
lessee. At the trial in the superior court without a jury, before
BACON, J., it appeared that Calrow, the previous tenant, had given
permission to Jones, McDuffee & Stratton to put a sign upon the
outside of the walls of the building, between the level of the floor
and that of the ceiling of the first floor, but had made no agreement
for compensation ; that the lessor had no knowledge of the existence of the signs in question, and made no objection to them at the
time of the lease to the defendant, nor until a short time before the
bringing of these actions ; that when the defendant took possession
of the premises said sign was still there, and that he made a contract with said Jones, McDuffee & Stratton, by which he agreed to
allow their sign to remain upon the wall in consideration of $150,
payable in advance; that the defendant placed two signs for his
own use upon the same part of the building, and agreed with certain other persons that they might paint over one of these with an
inscription of their own, in consideration of $12.50 a month, so
long as they should leave the same upon the building; that in pur.
suance of these agreements, the defendant received $600, and in
pursuance of the second $75. The court ruled, as matter of law,
that the outside of the walls in question was included in the lease,
and that the agreements of the defendant with the persons whom
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he allowed to place or retain signs upon the building did not amount
to an under-letting, and ordered judgment for the defendant in both
actions. At the request of the plaintiffs, the case was reported for
the determination of the supreme judicial court.
.. C. Lowell and A. L. Lowell, for plaintiffs.
Alfred Hemmenway and D. . Kimball, for defendant.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
W. ALLEN, J.-We think that the outside of the front wall was
part of the premises demised in the lease of the first floor in the
building. If the language had been used in a conveyance in feesimple, no question could have been made that the walls of the
building were included. Undoubtedly, the owner of a building
might, in conveying the lower and upper portions of it to different
grantees, except the outside of the walls as he might do in conveying the whole building to one grantee. In every case it is a question of intention, found in the language used as applied to the
subject-matter, and construed in connection with the whole instrument. A lease for years by indenture differs from a deed in feesimple, not only in the nature of the estate created, but also in the
fact that the instrument of demise is an agreement between the
parties, containing mutual covenants affecting their rights in the
premises. The words of description used should be construed in
view of these considerations, which might require a different meaning to be given to them than would be given to similar words in a
conveyance in fee.
The words "first floor in" the building are equivalent to first
story of the building, and naturally include the walls. The apparent intention is to separate a section of the building as a distinct
tenement. The words "first floor" define the lower and upper
boundaries of this, but there is nothing to fix the lateral boundaries except the boundaries of the building. In this respect the
"Floor" means a
words differ somewhat from the word "room."
section of the building between horizontal planes ; the words "in
a building" show that the section is of the whole building, and not
of a part of it. The word "room " includes a description of the
perpendicular as well as of the horizontal planes which bound the
parcel of the house described by it, and excludes the outside of
lateral walls, at least when they constitute the walls of another
room, as clearly as the words "first floor" exclude the flooring of
the story above it. Under what circumstances a lease of a story
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of a building would include a space beyond the building, over land
belonging to it, need not be considered. In this case the building
adjoins the sidewalk, and the "lower floor in the building" in the
lease must be held to include the entire front wall of that part of
the building, unless there is something to control the natural meaning of the language.
That the outside of the front wall would be valuable to the lessee as part of the premises, and that the lease gives him the right
to use it for some purposes, such as putting out signs and displaying goods, is not disputed ; but it is contended that the right is a
privilege or easement, appurtenant to the leased premises in a part
of the building not parcel of them. The defendant contends, on
the other hand, that the outside of the front wall is parcel of the
leased premises. It often occurs in leases of part of a building that
rights in other parts, or in land not parcel of the premises, as in
entries, passage-ways and yards, pass as appurtenant to them. The
question in such cases generally is not what is parcel of the demised
premises, but what is incident to them. In general, a deed or
lease of a house or store will include the land under it. In Stockwell v. Hunter, 11 Mete. 448, and Shawmut Nat. Bank v. Boston, 118 Mass. 125, it was held that the land under a building
would not pass as parcel of the premises in a lease of the basement
of a building the upper stories of which were let to other tenants.
Mr. Justice DEWEY says, in 11 Metc. 456 : "The proper construction of such a lease as the present, as it seems to us, is that
the lessee's right of occupation of the land is an interest, for the
time being, defeasible by the destruction of the building by fire."
Mr. Justice MORTON says, in 118 Mass. 129: "The real question
is whether the intention of the parties, to be collected from the
whole lease, was to grant to the lessees any estate in the land itself.
As we have seen, the lease does not, in terms, grant any estate in
the land. * * * In cases where different rooms in the same building are leased to separate tenants, the situation of the property,
and the nature of the tenures, exclude the idea that each tenant
takes an estate for years in the land. Such estates, existing at the
same time in different tenants, are inconsistent and impossible. * *
The bank and Lawrence cannot both take an estate for years in the
same land."
In the case at bar the words of description naturally include the
premises in question-the outer wall. It is plain that the lease
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grants an interest in them, not merely like the incidental right of
support or shelter which it grants in the land and other parts of
the house, but the right to use and enjoy, as leased premises, for
the purposes of business. That right is exclusive. The landlord
has no right to use or to let it for such purposes. From the mere
demise, without regard to special provisions of the lease, there is
no reason that the landlord should be regarded as having rights in
the outside different from what he has in the inside of the wall.
As owner of the upper tenement, he has a right in the whole wall
for support, but that right would not operate to except the walls,
by implication, from a deed in fee of the lower tenement, or from
a grant of it for years. The occasions that the reversioner would
have to enter upon the wall of the demised tenement must be few
and extraordinary, and it could not be inferred, from the fact that
the right was not expressly reserved in the lease, that the wall was
excepted from it. We can see nothing, therefore, in the nature of
the estate granted, that should prevent the outer wall from being
included as parcel of the demised premises. On the contrary, the
fact that it is of value to the tenant for the use for which the
premises may be occupied, and of no value for use to the landlord,
would indicate that it was part of the premises if the description
'as doubtful. If it did not pass by the lease in this case, it would
seem that the right which the plaintiff claims could be maintained.
The only right of the tenant would be to make such use of it as
would be incident to his grant of the adjoining premises, and the
right of the landlord would be to enter upon it, and make any use
of it not inconsistent with the incidental rights to use it of the tenant. He might not have a right to take down the tenant's sign,
but he would have the possession of the wall, and the right to enter
upon it, and to use any of it not actually used by the tenant for
any purpose not inconsistent with the use by the tenant of the
leased premises. It is not reasonable to suppose that this was the
intention of either party. The actual possession and use of
the wall by the tenant which the parties obviously intended is substantially that of leased premises, and it would be very difficult to
define or fix the respective rights of the parties in it, except on
the assumption that it is a part of the demised premises.
There is nothing in the particular provisions of the lease that
bears with much force upon the question. 'The covenant of the
lessee to repair is what would be expected, whether the outside of
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the wall were included or not, unless the suggestion is entitled to
some weight that if the outer surface of the wall was not included
the lessor would probably have insisted upon a special covenant by
the lessee to keep it in repair. Perhaps the covenant by the lessee
to save the lessor harmless from all damages arising from neglect
in not removing snow and ice from the roof of the building, or
"from the sidewalk bordering on the premises so leased," may
afford a slight inference that the wall, including the outer surface
of it, was part of the premises. The covenants by the lessee not
to underlet, and not to make any unlawful, improper, or offensive
use of the premises, nor any alterations or additions, and that the
lessor may enter upon the premises to examine the condition thereof,
while proper to protect the interest of the reversioner in the surface
of the wall, do not appear to have particular reference to that.
We can find nothing in the lease which militates against the idea
that the whole outer wall is included in the premises, and the
description of the premises as applied to the subject-matter and the
right in the outer surface of the wall, which it is reasonable to suppose the parties intended that the lessee should have, and the entire
reasonableness that the whole of the front wall of that part of the
building should be included in the lease of a floor or story of it, in
connection with the particular provisions of the lease, lead us to the
conclusion that the outer surface of the wall was part of the demised
premises. We find no authority against this.
Pevey v. Skinner, 116 Mass. 129, decided that, where different
rooms in a building were let to different tenants, a license by the
owner of the building to the tenant of a lower room, to place his
sign on the outer wall of the building, extending fifteen inches
higher than the floor of the room above, was not revoked by a lease
of the room above, which contained the provision that "the lessee
may have the right to place signs upon the outer wall of said rooms."
The general right of the lessee of a single room in the outer wall
was not considered. The court say: " His right to use the outer
surface of the wall was defined, and thereby limited by the terms
of the lease." The decision can have very little bearing upon the
lease of a "floor" which does not define and limit the right to use
the outer wall.
Riddle v. Littlefield, 53 N. H. 503, and Baldwin v. Morgan, 43
Hun 355, are directly in favor of the conclusion we have reached.
Loring v. Bacon, 4 Mass. 575, and (JAeeseborough v. Green, 10
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Conn. 319, are cases where the respective rights of owners of lower
and upper tenements in the same building are considered, but have
no particular bearing upon the case at bar.
It is claimed that the agreement of the defendant to allow the
sign of a stranger, in consideration of an annual payment by him,
to remain upon the outside wall demised, was a breach of the covenant in the lease not to underlet any part of the premises. But
this was a license, and not a lease. It was permission to do a particular act, to affix a sign to the wall, and gave no authority to do
any other act upon the premises. The fact that the permission was
paid for, and that the act permitted was a continuing one, are ordinary elements of a license. Every license to do an act upon land
involves the exclusive occupation of the land by the licensee, so far
as is necessary to do the act, and no further. A lease gives the
right of possessio n of the land, and the exclusive occupation of it
for all purposes not prohibited by its terms. It is clear in this
case that the intention was that the licensee should have no other
right in the premises than to affix his sign to them, and that every
other right should remain in the defendant. An agreement of this
nature cannot be construed as a lease. It must create either a
license or an easement.
In Pevey v. Skinner, ubi supra, it was said that permitting a
sign to be kept upon the wall for a long time would imply a license,
but it was not intimated that it would imply a lease of the outer
surface. We have not been referred to any case in which the question
here presented, or any closely resembling it, has arisen. Numerous
cases have arisen in England where the question was whether persons occupying land under particular agreements were liable to be
rated as occupiers. See Gory v. Bristow, 2 App. Cas. 262
Electric Tel. Co. v. Overseers of Salford, 11 Exch. 181; Lancashire Tel. Co. v. Overseers of Manchester, 14 Q. B. Div. 267;
Watkins v. Overseers of Milton-next-G-ravesend, L. R., 3 Q. B.
350; Forrestv. Overseers of Greenwich, 8 El. & B. 890.
In Selby v. Greaves, L. R., 3 0. P. 594, the letting of a defined
portion of a room in a factory, with steam-power for working lace
machines, was held to be a demise; and in Hancock v. Austin, 14
C. B. (N. S.) 634, permission to place lace machines in a room in
a factory, and to work them with steam-power furnished by the
owner of the factory, was held to be a license, and to create no
demise. The case last cited approaches nearest to the case at bar
VOL. XXXV.-91
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of any that we have seen, and in that the reasons for regarding the
transaction as a lease, are obviously stronger than in this case.
That was permission to occupy with fixed machines, a portion of
the floor, and space above it; this is permission to insert fastenings
in the outer wall, from which to suspend a sign in proximity to,
but outside of the building.
Judgment for the defendant in both cases.
The owner of the fee simple is entitled
to the fullest and most complete use and
enjoyment of every square inch and
particle of his possessions ; and certainly
in these is included the right to use the
outside surface of the walls of his buildings for the purpose of displaying any
sign or advertisement he may desire,
unless he is restricted by statutory or
municipal regulations, or the devices or
pictures upon the wall are of such a
character as to be libellous, or constitute
a nuisance. When a demise or letting
of the premises takes place, the mutual
rights and duties of the lessor and lessee
may be, and, to some extent,.generally
are, defined by express agreements, but
where there are no such agreements, the
tenant has, for the purposes of use, occupation and enjoyment, the same rights
that the landlord possessed, but he is
under two restrictions : he does not own
the freehold; and he is under an implied
obligation to surrender the premises, at
the end of his term, in substantially the
same order and condition as they were
when he received them, He is bound,
therefore, to use the property for the
purposes for which it was rented; if he
rents a store, he must use it as a store
only, but he is entitled to the full and
complete use of it as such, and if it is
the usual custom, in the line of business
in which the tenant is engaged, to display on the outside wall any sign or
advertisement, he is certainly entitled to
so use the wall.
The grant of property which is designated by a description passes not only
the thing itself, but also all the incidents

which are reasonably necessary to its full
enjoyment. A "mansion" includes not
only the dwelling-house, but the outhouses, barns, stables, &c., although
they are not under the same roof: Kerslake v. White, 2 Stark. 446. "Lands"
include all that grows or is built upon
the surface: Co. Lit. 4 a; Ishan v.
Morqan, 9 Conn. 374 ; In re N. Y. C.
Rd., 49 N. Y. 414; Bennet v. Bittle, 4
Rawle 339. A demise of rents and
profits is a demise of the land itself:
Parker v. Plummer, Cro. Eliz. 190.
Where machinery is used on demised
premises, and the lessor is to furnish the
power, a blast on lessor's premises, connected with the machinery, will be
treated as part of the leased premises,
and not as under amere license : 2rnropp
v. Field, 11 C. E. Green 82. The grant
of a "store" has been held to include
the land under the building and to the
middle of a private way in the rear, the
fee of which was in the lessor (Hooper
v. Farnsworth, 128 Mass. 487), and
also the complete control and use of the
roof: Alartyr v. Lawrence, 2 DeG., J. &
S. 261. In this case a ' shop" was
demised to H. C. by this description
"all that shop now used as a mart,
situate, &c., together with all rights,
privileges, easements, commodities and
appurtenances whatsoever to said shop.
bereditaments and premises, or any part
thereof belonging or usually held and
enjoyed therewith ;" the landlord reserving the right to use and occupy the roof
of said shop. The same landlord, who
owned the adjoining house, demised it to
a tenant, with the right of walking and
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sitting upon the roof of the shop. H.
C.'s lease having terminated, the shop
was let to the plaintiff by the description
of, "all that shop, situate, &c., as the
same was late in the occupancy of H. C."
The adjoining house was let to defendant, with the right of occupying the roof
of the shop, and of erecting thereon a
photographic studio. The plaintiff filed
a bill to restrain the erection of the
studio. The court held that the words,
"as the same was late in the occupancy
of H. C.," were to be considered as
inserted only for the purpose of identifying the property, and not of limiting the
operation of the lease under which the
plaintiff had the right of occupying and
using the roof, and therefore the erection
of the studio by the defendant was an
unlawful act, and the injunction was
granted. If the roof and the ground
under the building passes by a lease
which does not expressly mention either,
why should not the tenant have the same
control and use of the walls, including
the outside surface ? The unrestricted
control of the latter is certainly as important to him as of the former, and, for
certain practical purposes, may be even
more so. If the right to the outside surface does not pass to the tenant, it must
remain in the landlord; and if it remains
in the lessor, he would be enabled to
grant, by lease or license, the use of the
surface to another person-a rival in trade
of the tenant--and so seriously injure,
and perhaps destroy, his tenant's business.
Would such use of the wall be waste
on the part of the tenant ? Every tenant, where there is no express contract,
is under an implied obligation not to
commit waste: U. S. v. Bostwick, 94
U. S. 53; Miller v. Shields, 55 Ind.
71. Waste is defined to be any destruction or injury of the premises to the disherison of him in remainder or reversion.
The test in determining what is waste is
not injury to the premises but the disherison of the reversioner or remainder-

man: Livingston v. Reynolds, 26 Wend,
115 ; Kidd v. Dennison, 6 Barb. 9. The
injury must be permanent; as cutting,
or peeling the bark of trees, when not
necessary for cultivation : People v. Atberty, I1 Wend. 162 ; Jackson v.Brownson, 7 Johns. 227. It must be destructive of the demised premises ; as opening
new mines where the demise makes no
mention of mines; digging and removing
soil : Coates v. Cheever, I Cow. 460;
using soil for bricks ; changing its face,
by turning arable land into pasture; varying in any manner the quality of the
soil or the nature of its products : Math.
erell v. Bowells, I Camp. 227; Sarlr v.
Sarle, 3 Sandf. Ch. 601 ; Shipley v.
Rlitter, 7 Md. 408 ; Clement v. IWheeler,
25 N. H. 361. Altering one kind of
building into another, even though the
value is increased, as a dwelling-house
into a store: Douglass v. Wiggins, I
Johns. Ch. 435. But the use of premises
for the purpose for which they were
rented, in a reasonable and proper manner, even though an injury is caused, is
not a waste; as where the floor of a
grain-warehouse gave way by reason of
the storing of grain therein: &ner v.
Bilton, 7 Ch. D. 815 : .ianch. Bonded
Warehouse Co. v. Carr, 5 C. P. D. 507.
What constitutes waste, however, varies with the changing condition of society and the customs of trade, and it has
been held that a tenant was not guilty of
waste who erected a new building on the
demised premises or made alterations,
when such building or alterations did
not destroy or materially injure the buildings already existing: Winship v. Pitts,
3 Paige 259. And also, that a tenant
authorized to make alterations could
make such alterations as his business required, provided no injury was done:
Agate v. Lowenbeim, 57 N. Y. 604. The
right to exhibit signs and to info'm the
public of the name of the proprietor and
the nature of his business, is certainly
reasonably necessary to the full enjoyment of a ulace leased for business pur.
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poses.
Some locations are especially
desirable, because of their advantages
for advertising. There is no case, it is
believed, which decides that the reasonable and proper use of the wall for signs
is waste. Ordinarily, they are so easily
removed and their traces are so slight,
that the injury to the building is scarcely
appreciable. Of course, if the tenant has
abused his right by fastening unusual
signs,so heavy and of such a nature that
the wall is permanently weakened or
injured, or by destroying the surface by
cutting into it, or by painting all over
the walls of a very large building so that
the owner has the perpetual burden and
expense of keeping it painted, when it
would otherwise be unnecessary, he
would probably be guilty of committing
waste.
If, however, the tenant has rented the
interior only of a room or store, which is
bounded by the outside wall of a building, has he any right to the use of the
surface of said wall for signs ? Easements may be conveyed by implied as
well as express grant. When one grants
or leases land entirely surrounded by his
own property, away of necessity is held to
be granted by implication, because such
must have been the intention of the
parties. Certain easements also spring
into existence when there occurs what is
called a division of the heritage-as where
one rents a part of a larger lot, or one
house in a row-although before the division they did not exist, as one cannot
have an easement in his own land.
Where one grants a part of a larger lot,
or one house in a row, or a flat in a house,
easements of lateral or horizontal support in the remaining and immediately
adjacent property of the grantor pass to
the grantee by implication. Such implied easements must be continuous and
apparent, and at least reasonably, and in
some cases absolutely, necessary. The
courts differ in their application of the
rule. Some hold that an easement by
reservation must be absolutely necessary,

while one by implied grant must be only
reasonably so. They also differ as to
what easements are continuous and apparent. Ways have been held to pass by
implied grant, although not necessary,
but only convenient. And an easement
of drainage has been held to be apparent
though not visible. Of course, the purchaser must have known that drainage
was necessary, and therefore he was put
upon inquiry.
The law is thus stated by Washburn,
in his work on Easements and Servitudes :
"Where one sells
a part of a larger
estate, privileges in favor of the part
sold are held to pass as incidents to the
same, and corresponding burdens are
imposed upon the unsold portion, from
the nature of the estate, the arrangements of its parts, and the degree af necessity there is of giving such a construction to the conveyance in order to give
it a reasonable effect." There is no case
which decides that the tenant of the interior of a store has an easement in the
outside surface of the wall, which would
authorize its use for signs, yet the reasoning of the decisions would seem to
suggest that there might be such an easement under some circumstances.
The right of the lessor or lessee to the
use of the outside wall came before the
courts in two or three cases only, prior
to Lowell et al. v. Strahan, supra. The
only other case in Massachusetts seems to
be Pevey v. Skinner, 116 Mass. 129, decided in 1874. The defendant was the
lessee of a " store with the cellar and privileges thereto belonging," and for some
years had upon the surface of the outside
wall a sign which extended some distance above the floor-line of the second
story.
The plaintiffs, during the occupancy
of defendant, and while his sign was in
this condition, leased a front room on the
second floor of the same huilding, and his
lease contained the provision, that IIthe
lessee may have the right to place signs
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upon the outside of the wall of his room."
The action was against the tenant of the
store for maintaining a sign upon the
wall of the room leased to plaintiff. It
was held that the plaintiff's right under
his lease was a privilege and not an exclusive right ; that he had leased the
room subject to the condition the premises
were in when the lease was made; and
the law would infer, from the length of
time defendant had maintained his sign
in the same position, that he had a license from the landlord so to do.
In 1873, the case of Riddle v. Littlefield, 53 N. H. 503, came before the
Supreme Court of New Hampshire. The
plaintiff was the owner of a building, on
the first floor of which was a store. The
defendant was the lessee of the store,
which was described in the lease as "a
certain store known as 191 Elm street,
with the privileges and appurtenances
thereto belonging." No mention was
made in the lease of signs. The plaintiff had, during the occupancy of the
tenant who preceded the defendant,rented
the outside surface of the outer wall
of the store to third persons for posting
handbills, &c., and the then tenant had
made no objection. No especial mention
was made in defendant's lease of this
portion of the wall, but it gave him the
right to take down part of this wall and
put in a window. He, however, had
never done so, but claimed the right
to the use of the entire wall, and rented
the outer surface of it to third persons
to post handbills, &c., from whom he
collected money for such use. The action was by the landlord for money
received for his use, upon the ground
that the right to the use of the outside
surface remained in him.
The court held that the plaintiff could
not maintain his action, as the defendant
had, under his lease, the right to the use
and occupation of the entire wall of that
part of the premises which included the
store ; that he took it as a part of the
demised premises, and not as a thing

technically appurtenant thereto ; that the
outside of the leased premises was conveyed by the lease as much as the inside. In Baldwin v. Morgan, 50 S. C.
R. (N. Y.) [43 Hun] 355, the plaintiff, who was tile lessee of a corner store
and cellar, had painted upon the outside
wall of the store certain signs, pictures,
&a., as advertisements. The lease contained no stipulation as to signs, and
they did not extend beyond the walls of
the store portion of the building. The
landlord threatened to erase these signs,
for the reason that they depreciated the
renting value of his building, and the
tenant applied for an injunction to restrain him. This was granted ; the court
holding that, as the pictures were not
offensive, and were germane to the plaintiff's business, he had the right, under
his lease, to the use of the wall for their
display, and the defendant must submit
to the inconvenience if there was any.
The two cases of Hele et al. v. Stewart
& Albrecht & Co.; and Jones et al. v.
Same, 19 W. N. C. (Pa.) 129, came before the Court of Common Pleas No. I
of Philadelphia County in 1879. Stewart was the owner of the building; Albrecht & Co. the lessees of the store on
the first floor ; and the plaintiffs the lessees of front rooms used for business
jurposes, the third and fourth stories respectively. The leases were in the usual
form, and were silent as to signs. Albrecht & Co. and their predecessors in
business had occupied the store from
1867. The old firm ltad signs on the
front of the building, which were taken
down in November 1877 and not put up
again. In September 1877, and February 1879, the plaintiffs took possession
of their respective rooms, and there were
then no signs in front of their rooms. In
the latter part of 1879, .Albrecht & Co.
obtained permission from the defendant,
Stewart, to put up signs under the windows of the second, third and fourth stories. Plaintiffs objected to this, and in
October 1879 placed certain signs in
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the front wall of their respective rooms.
In November 1879, Stewart entered
plaintiff's rooms,withont their knowledge
or consent, and caused the signs of
.Albrecht & Co. to be put in position on
the front wall under plaintiff's windows.
Bills were filed to compel the removal
of these signs. After testimony had
been taken, the matter was referred to a
master, whose report was filed in 1886.
The master stated that he found no
authorities on the subject-and, therefore, it is fair to presume that the learned
counsel found none-although Riddle v.
Littlefield had been decided in 1873.
He further stated the question that" does
the leasing of certain premises for business purposes, by a lease drawn in the
ordinary form, entitle the lessee to use
the front walls of such premises for the
purpose of placing out the proper signs
as advertisements of his business," and
reported that in his opinion it should be
considered in the affirmative, "for the
reason that leasing the premises for a
business purpose contemplates their use
in such lawful manner as shall best further the interests of the lessee, and, in
this age of energy and enterprise, advertising by signs has become so much a
matter of course, that in a great city, and

upon a building such as the one leased in
part to plaintiffs, such use of the front
wall would be expected, and, therefore,
may be held to have been in contemplation by the parties to the lease." He
decided in favor of plaintiffs, and recommended a decree as prayed for.
Exceptions were filed to the master's report, both as to his law and to his failure
to find certain facts as defendants
desired. These exceptions were sustained by the court, and the plaintiffs
bills dismissed with costs. As no written opinion was delivered or filed by the
court it is impossible to tell upon what
ground they dismissed the bills, but their
decree would indicate that they considered the master's law entirely incorrect. It is, perhaps, a little unfortunate
that, in a case where a question of so
much importance to the thousands of
tenantsin a large place like Philadelphia,
which came before the court for the first
time apparently, there is no opinion, on
record or reported, which might indicate
what the court supposed the law to be.
It would seem, however, that, in these
cases, the guess of the master was right,
and the guess of the court was wrong.
Wt. H. BURNPTT.
Phila.

Court of Appeals of .New York.
HICKEY, By GUARDIAN, &C., v. TAAFFE.
The duty to furnish safe machinery, which the law imposes upon an employer,
does not require that the machinery used shall be the best and latest improved of its
kind, but only that it shall be reasonably safe and suitable for the purpose.
Where an employee has knowledge of the position, character and danger of the
machinery with which be has to do, he assumes the risks incident to the employment.

In employing a person of immature years and judgment to work upon dangerous
machinery, it is the duty of the master to see that such person fully understands its
dangerous character, and appreciates such dangers, and the consequences of a want
of care ; and if the employee is too young to realize, after full instruction, the danger of the work, and the necessity of exercising care, the employer puts or keeps
him at such work at his own risk.

HICKEY v. TAAFFE.
Plaintiff, a girl between fourteen and fifteen years old, was employed by defendant
in his laundry, to feed collars to an ironing machine, and while so employed, about six
weeks after she began to do the work, caught her finger in the button-hole of a collar, and, being unable to extricate it, had her hand drawn between the rollers and
badly injured. It appeared that, although plaintiff had not been instructed in the
danger of working the machine, she fully realized and appreciated its dangerous
character ; that the machine was in a safe and suitable condition, and that the accident was due entirely to the unforeseen and extraordinary cause of getting her finger
caught in the button-hole: Held, that the employer was noa liable.
RUGUR, C. J., and DAx.onTu, J., dissenting.

from general term, supreme court, second department.
Action to recover damages for personal injuries. Plaintiff had
judgment below.
APPEAL

.Ese Cowen, for appellant.
Patrick .Keady,for respondent.
PECKHAM, J.-The plaintiff was a young girl, employed by
defendant in his laundry. At the time of her first coming there,
in April 1882, she was fourteen years and four months old, and
was employed by the sister of defendant, who superintended that
department of the work, to bunch collars and cuffs, which was a
perfectly safe employment. Before going to the laundry she had
never worked nor seen machinery used in a steam laundry. She
remained at this employment until June 16th of the same year,
when defendant's sister came to her (as she says), and, after telling
her that the person who fed the machine in question was absent,
asked her to go over to it and take her place, which she did; and
she was there shown how to put the collars and cuffs through, and
was told to be careful and not let any laps go through,-any ears,
-that is, so that no part of the collars should lap over another
part.
This machine had a platform in front of it, upon which the feeder
sat in a chair, and placed the collars and cuffs which were to be put
through the ironing process on a flat desk in front of her. There
were two rollers at the further edge of the desk, one on top of the
other. The lower one was hot enough to iron the collars as they
passed through, while the upper pressed down upon it with a pressure of about two hundred pounds. The collars were fed to these
rollers by the feeder; and as one collar was started in on the left
side of the machine, and "gripped" by the rollers, another was
placed in position by the side of it, and so on until the sixth would
just be taken by the rollers as the first one disappeared, and the
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space left vacant for another collar. There was a belt by which the
machine was operated, which, however, could not be reached by
the person feeding; but there was a girl at the rear or other end
of the machine, where the collars came out, who started and stopped
it. The heated roller is hollow, and revolves around gas jets, and
is heated to such a heat that if a collar stopped on it for a minute
it would have been scorched brown or burned. If a person's hand
were caught between these rollers, it could not be dragged out, and
the machine would have to be stopped, and the weights which
pressed it down would have to be removed from the upper roller.
This machine would iron about 600 dozen pieces in the course of a
working day. There were no guards in front of the rollers for the
purpose of preventing anything from being drawn between them.
The defendant, on his examination, said that at one time he had
himself placed a lever or shifter on this machine by which to start
and stop it. It was overhead on the ceiling, and it could not be
reached from where the plaintiff sat, but could be handled by a cord.
That lever had been off about two months at the time when the
accident occurred for which this action is brought. Defendant says
he found the lever was not convenient, and the old way was the
easiest and safest. He says he did not take it off, as a matter of
economy, because the girls used to take too much time in stopping
that lever. There never was at any time a lever or shifter within
reach of the platform where the feeder sat. The machine as it
existed on the day of the accident was in perfect repair and condition, according to the plan upon which it was built, and it did not
appear from the evidence that there was in use any machine moved
by steam for ironing collars which had any other or better or safer
means for stopping it, or for guarding the person who fed it.
On the 16th of June, when plaintiff went to work at this machine,
she had never used any of the machines in the laundry. She says
that no one in the factory ever instructed her as to the dangers of
this machine; neither defendant nor anybody else ever gave her
any such instructions. Before the plaintiff, no operator or feeder
of the machine had ever been hurt, although there were several of
such machines in the laundry, and they had been in use several
years. One person had been injured, but she was not an operator,
and had no proper business at the machine when in operation. For
six weeks, or from June 16th to July 26th, the day she was
injured, the plaintiff worked constantly on this machine in feeding
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the collars and cuffs. During this time she says defendant had
talked to her about her hair being loose or too long, and he told her
to keep her hair up in front, because it might get caught in the
roller and be burned off. She also said she knew the rollers were
so close together that they would, if they caught the hair, either
draw it out of her forehead, or burn it off by the heat, and she
knew this did once occur. She got her own hair caught once four
or five days after she was first employed on it, and she knew thenthe rollers were hot enough to iron a collar, and she had always
been told there was a pressure of the upper roller on the lower.
She also said she knew that, if her hand was caught between the
rollers of that machine, that it would be burned and crushed, and
she knew that other girls had had their hair caught and burned off
on the machine. As to the weight of the pressure of the upper
roller upon the lower, she knew it was pressed upon or weighted
with weights which she saw, and she saw the upper roller raised
by means of a lever, which was operated by stooping down and
making great pressure with the body on the lever, which would
then raise the roller. For six weeks she had had the experience
of working at and feeding this machine, and had obtained the
knowledge above stated, when, on the twenty-sixth day of July,
the accident in question happened. She gives this account of the
manner of its happening:
"I commenced on the left-hand side, and commenced to put it
[the collar] through the machine. I caught a collar with an ear
on it. I put my finger out to pull it out, and my hand was caught
and drawn right through. The way it got caught, it was an old
collar; my finger got caught in the button-hole, and I could not
get it out. The machine went quite fast. There was a lap in the
ear of a stand-up collar-gentleman's collar. The button-hole part
was lapped back on the collar. I put my finger out to pull it out,
and my hand was caught and drawn right through. I tried to get
it out. I put out my foot to push off the belting, and could not
reach it."
The girl at the other end of the machine heard the cries, and
stopped the machine. The plaintiff's hand was then taken out,
the upper roller having been raised, and she was taken home. She
was most terribly bu'rned and bruised, and suffered an injury of a
permanent nature, and which may result in the entire loss of her
hand, and perhaps arm up to the elbow.
VOL. XXXV.-92

HICKEY v. TAAFFE.

The plaintiff commenced this action to recover for the injury,
and in her complaint alleged that the defendant, " carelessly and
unlawfully, set the plaintiff to work on machinery which was dangerous to her life and limb without informing her of such danger,
and of which she was entirely ignorant, * * * and that defendant

well knew that said machinery was dangerous and unsafe ; that
through the gross negligence, carelessness, and wrong-doing of the
defendant, * * * and without any negligence on the part of plaintiff, plaintiff's right hand was caught in defendant's machinery," &c.
The plaintiff had a verdict, which was affirmed at the general term,
and the defendant appealed to this court.
The counsel for defendant, upon the argument here, very properly
as we think, from the testimony, conceded there was no question of
contributory negligence in the case.
The right of the plaintiff to maintain this recovery was placed
by her counsel upon three grounds: (1) The duty of defendant to
furnish safe, sound and suitable tools and machinery for the use of
the plaintiff; (2) the negligence of defendant in failing to warn
the plaintiff of the character of the machine, and its dangers from
lack of proper appliances to stop it by the person feeding it; (3)
the defendant's violation of the original contract of employment by
taking her from "bunching" the collars, and placing her at work
feeding this dangerous machine.
1. The duty to furnish safe machinery means, of course,
machinery that is safe, considering the use for which it is designed,
for otherwise very little machinery could be operated. A steamengine may be built in the best manner, of the best materials, &c.,
and yet there is the possible danger inherent in the nature of the
machine itself, as operated by such an element, which may lead to
an explosion that could not be foreseen or guarded against. Nor
does the duty of furnishing a safe machine oblige an employer to
furnish the best possible appliances. His duty is discharged when
be furnishes a machine which is reasonably safe and suitable.
.Burke v. Witherbee, 98 N. Y. 562.
We are of opinion that the defendant in this case fully complied
with all his legal obligations in this behalf. The machine that he
furnished was in perfect repair at the time of the accident. There
was but one way to stop it, and that was by taking the belt off at a
point in rear of the rollers in front of which the plaintiff sat. The
machine was built on that plan, and was one of a large number of
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the same kind, and used for the same purpose. There was no evidence that a machine for this purpose had ever been built which
could be stopped in any other manner.
The defendant, it is true, some time before the plaintiff came to
the machine to work it, had himself provided other and additional
means of stopping the machine ; but, as he says in his testimony,
which upon this point is wholly uncontradicted, it was found not to
work as well as the old way, and these additional means bad been
removed before the plaintiff was placed as a feeder at the machine.
But, even if the means had remained, the plaintiff, after her hand
was caught, could not have reached the lever to stop the action of
the machinery. The defendant could remove these things which
he had placed upon the machine by way of experiment to test their
usefulness and convenience, without being, under the circumstances
of this case, guilty of any negligence. The same observations apply with added force to the fact that there were no guards in front
of the rollers. The defendant had never himself placed any there,
and none had been known to have been placed on any such machine in any other factory where used. Indeed, it could not be
expected that such guards should be placed there, for it is plain
that they would materially interfere with the working of the
machine.
But the plaintiff, in accepting this work, and entering upon the
employment about this machine, assumed the usual risks and perils
of the employment, and such as were incident to the use of this
machine in its then condition, so far as such risks were apparent.
I speak of this as the general rule, and whatever exception there
may be to it on account of the youth of the plaintiff will be spoken
of hereafter. But upon the general proposition as to the use of
machinery, there is no doubt that an employee, in accepting service with a knowledge of the character and position of the machinery, the dangers of which are apparent, and from which he
might be liable to receive injury, assumes the risks incident to the
employment, and he cannot call upon the defendant to make alterations to secure greater safety: Gibson v. _Erie By., 63 N. Y. 449 ;
Powers v. New York, L. .. 4 W. Bd., 98 N. Y. 274; Shaw v. Sheldon, 103 N. Y. 667; 9 N. E. Rep. 183.
We see no failure of defendant to comply with his legal obligations as to the first ground of liability maintained by plaintiff's
counsel..
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2. As to the second, there is no doubt that, in putting a person
of immature years at work upon machinery which in some aspects
may be termed dangerous, an employer is bound to give the employee such instructions as will cause him to understand and fully
appreciate the difficulties and dangers of his position, and the necessity there is for the exercise of care and caution. Merely going
through the form of giving instructions, even if such form included
everything requisite to a proper discharge of his duties by such
employee, if understood, would not be sufficient. In placing a
person of this description at work upon dangerous machinery, such
person must understand, in fact, its dangerous character, and be
able to appreciate such dangers, and the consequences of a want of
care, before the master will have discharged his whole duty to such
an employee : Sullivan v. India Manuf'g Co., 113 Mass. 396, at
399; Finnerty v. Prentice, 75 N. Y. 615 (MS. opinion, ANDRnEWS,
J.), where such rule is recognised as existing in this state. If a
person is so young that, even after full instructions, he wholly
fails to understand them, and does not appreciate the dangers arising from a want of care, then he is too young for such employment, and the employer puts or keeps him at such work at his own
risk.
Assuming the plaintiff's statement in this case to be true, that
she had no instructions as to the danger of the machine, and that
she had never worked at any machinery before, if, under such circumstances, this aceident had happened within a short time of her
employment, and because of her unfamiliarity with, and lack of
appreciation of, the dangers attendant upon the working of the
machine, the defendant may well have been liable for the damages
sustained by her on account of such ignorance. But the case discloses wholly different facts. It is conclusively shown from her own
evidence, already quoted, that she was aware of, and fully appreciated and understood, the dangers to be apprehended from working the machine, and it is equally clear, and from the same source
of information, that she was perfectly competent to discharge this
duty of feeding the machine long before the accident occurred. She
had not, it is true, received any instructions as to its dangers from
the defendant or his agents, as she says, but she had acquired the
information, in fact, from the best of all teachers, that of practical
experience. She knew, therefore, all that the instructions of the
defendant would have imparted to her. This was enough. Being
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of age to appreciate, and having full knowledge of, the danger, and
at the same time being competent to perform the duty demanded
from her, the fact that she was a minor does not alter the general
rule of law upon the subject of employees taking upon themselves
the risks which are patent and incident to the employment: De
Graff v. New York Cent., .c., Rd., 76 N. Y. 125; Coombs v. New
Bedford Co., 102 Mass. 572, at 585 ; Sullivan v. Indian Cordage
Manuqfg Co., 113 Id. 396-398; King v. Boston &' W. Bd., 9
Cush. 112. The learned judge, in delivering the opinion at general
term. while stating that the case was a border one, observes that
" it may well be that there were methods of performing the duties
which, if duly communicated to the plaintiff, would have avoided
the risks ot accident." But the plaintiff, in her own evidence, says
she was instructed as to the method of performing the duties which
she was placed there to discharge. It is only as to the dangers to
be apprehended from the machine which she says were never imparted to her.
There seems still to be another answer to this part of the plaintiff's claim ; and that is, the injury did not occur on account of any
act done or omitted on her part because of any want of knowledge
or appreciation of the dangers of the machine. She attempted to
straighten out a "lap " in a collar, the further end of which was
caught by the machine. Her hand was distant from the rollers
the whole length of the collar, and but for the unfortunate, and not
to be foreseen accident by which her finger was caught in the button-hole, and from which she could not extricate it in time, the
plaintiff's hand would not have been caught by the rollers. In the
act of trying to straighten out this "lap" at the time she did, it is
impossible to hold that such act was the least evidence of a lack of
appreciation or of familiarity with the dangers of the machine, and
it would have been error to submit such a proposition to a jury.
Prima facie, it was a perfectly safe act; and would have so resulted but for this accident, which no human being would have
thought of as possible to occur; and it is not admissible, therefore,
to say that the injury to the plaintiff arose from any lack of knowledge on her part, even though she had received no instructions from
the defendant.
3. The third proposition is not borne out by the facts. There is
no evidence that the father of plaintiff knew that she was going
to the defendant's laundry when she first went, or that he knew
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the character of the service she performed there. It is plain, from
her own evidence, that she went there to obtain employment such
as the defendant or his agents might place her at, and she took her
turn at this machine, so far as it appears, willingly, and kept it
safely for six weeks before she was injured. As there is no basis,
in fact, for the plaintiff's claim, it is unnecessary to discuss its correctness as a statement of the law.
These are the chief grounds made by plaintiff's counsel for an
affirmance of this judgment, and we have examined all that he has
urged with very great care and attention. The case is a most important one; certainly to the plaintiff, who has, without any fault
of her own, sustained a most terrible and painful and permanent
injury; and her case is one that appeals most strongly to the sympathies of every one. But we do not see how this judgment can
stand without overthrowing well-settled and healthful principles
of law.
We think the motion for a nonsuit should have been granted, and
for that reason the judgment should be reversed, and a new trial
ordered; costs to abide event.
All concur, except RUGER, 0. J., and DANFORTH, J., dissenting.
The rule of duty imposed upon a master employing persons of immature years
to work upon or about dangerous machinery, as stated in this case by Mr. Justice
PECKHAM, in disposing of the second
ground on which plaintiff based her right
to recover, seems to require a somewhat
too severe and an impracticable measure
of care on the part of the employer. His
duty is made to extend not only to giving
such instruction as will enable the employee to properly perform the work
expected of him, and is not limited to
poiuting out the dangers incident to the
work in the situation where be is placed,
with such care and particularity that a
youth of his age and apparent intelligence
would reasonably be supposed to comprehend the risks from them, but such
employee must be made to understand
and appreciate, in fact, the dangers
of the work and the consequences of his
neglect to exercise care in avoiding injury. The master's whole dhty is not

performed, and he is not relieved from
liability, unless and until the youthful
employee has been so effectuallyinformed
and instructed. If he is so young that,
after full instruction, he fails to comprehend and appreciate the danger arising
from a want of care on his part, he is too
young for such employment, and the
master must take the risk of putting or
keeping him at the work, and must
answer in damages for the injuries that
may happen to such employee. Every
rule of law, designed to prescribe a
measure of duty of one class of persons
in a particular situation in relation to
others ought to have the merit of being
practicable, so that any one of the class,
of average intelligence, may apply it to
his own conduct, and know when he has
discharged his duty to the full requirement of the law. The rule laid down in
this case seems open to criticism in this
respect. It is easy enough of application
in cases of persons near the two ex-
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tremes of the age designated as "iimmature years." If a child is so young as
manifestly to be unable, after full instruction, to do the work in a given
situation with safety to himself, exercising only such care as is to be expected
of one of his years, this is reasonably
plain to the perception of every employer of ordinary sense and understanding who is willing to give proper
attention to his duty. But after this age
-say from thirteen or fourteen years
upwards--there is a very large class
of employees whose general intelligence,
understanding and capacity to appreciate
and avoid dangers, is not measured by
yea-s, is as various as the persons who
compose it, and is not manifested by any
outward signs which will indicate to the
employer whether or not is instructions
have reached the mind and understanding of the employee-whether or not the
latter has been so effectually informed of
the dangers of the employment and the
necessity of care on his part, that he will
be able to do Mis work with safety to
himself. It will scarcely do to say that
the master, to be safe, must reject the
labor of all persons of this class unless
he is assured that his instructions have
been successful to the extent required by
the rule. This would exclude from the
factories and workshops, and relegate to
idleness, a majority, perhaps, of the
youth whose necessities and the poverty
of whose parents require that, at this
age, they should be bread-winners.
According to the rule laid down the
master's instructions may be ever so full
and painstaking, and such as from the
age and apparent intelligence of the employee might be supposed to reach his
appreciation, yet if in point of fact he is
not made to comprehend the risks, the
master must stand ready to answer for
the consequences. This makes a hard
case for the employer. Add to the
difficulty-he impossibility-of knowing
when his instructions have reached the
measure of the rule, the readiness of a

jury-as juries are usually composedto credit the tostimony of a badly injured
plaintiff of this class, that the instructions he had received did not enable him
to understand the dangers, and that he
was, in fact, ignorant of the risks of is
employment, the master stands little
chance of escape, no matter how careful
and thorough have been his instructions.
It is not intended to be intimated that
employers of youthful labor have, as a
class, been zealous to learn and perform
the full measure of their duty in this reOn tle contrary, experience
spect.
shows that where instructions have been
given, it has usually been done with a
view to getting the most and best work
out of the employee, without any regard
whatever to his safety. But employers
of youth will eventually learn the importance of attending to their proper
instruction, and they are entitled to a
practical rule. And it is suggested that
the limit of the master's duty, in respect
to this branch of the rule, should be
reached on his giving such information,
instruction and warning to the employee,
having regard to his age and apparent
intelligence, and to the character and
extent of the dangers involved in the
employment, as should, in the judgment
of men of ordinary sense and understanding, reach the employee's appreciation and enable him to perform his work
safely. While this calls for the exercise
of a high degree of caution on the part
of the employer of persons of immature
years, and would make him liable for
injuries arising from the employment of
inexperienced young persons in situations of great danger, where they might
reasonably and naturally be expected to
receive hurt in spite of instructions and
warnings, still the rule suggested is practicable. The employer is required only
to give such instructions as under all the
circumstances of a given case would reasonably put the employee in a position to
work with safety-and this, in the judgment of men of ordinary sense and un-
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derstanding. He is not required to do
what, it is submitted, he cannot do, to
wit, to know whether or not his cautions
have taken effectual hold of the mind he
is dealing with, or whether or not the
employee does, in the words of the opinion, " understand, in fact" the dangers
of the work and become "able to appreciate such dangers and the consequences of a want of care." It does
not seem reasonable to impose the solution of such a problem upon men engaged
in the practical affairs of life.
The case itself does not call for the
application of so strict a rule. Tile
plaintiff alleged that when she went to
work on the machine at which she was
hurt, she had no experience of any kind
of machinery, and that she was not instructed or warned in regard to the dangers incident to operating it, and the
court say that if the accident, under such
circumstances had happened in a short
time after her employment, and because
of her infamiliarity with and lack of appreciation of the dangers attending the
working of the machine, the defendant
might well have been liable for the damages sustained by her on account of such
negligence, but that her own evidence
showed that long before the accident
occurred she had learned, by practical
experience in the use of the machine,
the dangers to be apprehended from
operating it and was competent to perform the work, and that she knew all
that the instructions of the defendant
would have imparted. The facts of the
case did not bring before the court the
question of the kind and extent of instructions required of the master-shealleged that no instruction had been
given her, and her testimony showed
that she knew as fully as any adult could
know and as the strictest rule could require the perils of her employment. The
case of Finerty v. Prentice, 75 N. Y.
615, cited as an authority for this statement of the rule, is not of much value
as a precedent. The whole report con-

sists of a statement of the reason why
the case is not reported in full, to wit,
because a majority of the court did not
concur in the opinion, though a bare
majority did concur in affirming the judgment of the court below. The case is,
however, reported in 19 Albany Law J.
160, where a statement of the facts in
the case, but only an abstract of the opinion of Judge ANDREws, are given. So
far as thereby appears, the question of
the extent and sufficiency of the instructions to the employee was not necessarily
raised. Tile controversy was apparently
over the question whether any warning
or notice was given of the dangers arising from oiling the machine while in motion. The little value of the case as an
authority will not warrant further com- •
ment here.
In Sullivan v. The India Ifanuf. Co.,
113 Mass. 396, the other case cited in
support of the statement of the rule in
the principal case, the plaintiff was about
fourteen years of age, when employed
by defendants, and had worked about
the machinery three or four weeks before
he was hurt, and on machinery in another factory for several months before he
came to work for the defendants. His
duty was to remove the full cans from
two hemp-drawing machines to another
part of the room where the hemp was
requirdd for another process and to put
empty cans in their place, to be filled
and removed in their turn--work in itself
simple and not dangerous. - He claimed
at the trial that he had been told by defendants' foreman to do as another boy,
engaged in the same employment, did,
and that the other boy went through the
narrow space between the two machines
standing parallel to each other-the unfenced cog-wheel gearing, on the side of
one of them projecting a few inches from
the surface and towards the other, and
that while doing so, pushing one can
and pulling another, his arm was caught
and crushed between the cog-wheels. It
was shown that on the other side of tl.e
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machines and in a line where the plaintiff's work required him to go, was a
large open space where lie could have
passed without danger of injury. Plaintiff claimed that the gearing should have
been fenced or covered, and that defendants' failure to do so was negligence and
made them liable for the injury. The
defendants' foreman contradicted the
plaintiff's story, as to the instructions
given, and said that neither the other boy,
nor anyone else, passed through the narrow space between the machines unless
without his knowledge. The trial judge
instructed the jury that if plaintiff could
recover at all, it was because the boy
was manifestly so incapable of understanding the nature and extent of the
danger as to he unable to perform his
work there safely without instructions,
which were not given. The verdict was
for the defendants, and in the Supreme
Court, the plaintiff contended that there
was error in the instruction to the jury
as to defendants' duty to fence the cogs
and in the instructions above quotedbut the court held that plaintiff had consented to the dangers of the work, all of
which were apparent, and if he had sufficient knowledge and capacity to comprehend them (which the jury had found
to be the case) he could not afterwards
complain that the place could have been
made safer-and held that the instruction
above quoted was correct and affirmed
the judgment. It is to be observed that
the question as to whether or not the
above-quoted directior to the jury was
right by no means involved the consideration of the whole measure of duty of
the employer to the employee of immature years. So far as it attempted to
define the duty of the master, it was
far short of the terms of the rule laid
down in the principal case, and easily
within the rule above suggested as more
reasonable and practicable. It is true
that in delivering the opinion of the
court, DFvENs, J., after remarking that
there was no evidence that the plaintiff
VOL. XXXV.-93

was incapable of appreciating the dangers to which he was exposed or of
doing the work safely without instruction and cautions which he did not receive, says : "It would be a breach of
duty on the part of the master to expose
a servant who, from youth, inexperience,
ignorance, or general want of capacity,
would fail to appreciate the dangers of a
particular position for, or mode of, doing
the work ;" referring in his opinion to
the case of Coombs v. New Bedford
Cordage Co., 102 Mass. 572-600. This
case was so elaborately argued by counsel and carefully considered by the very
able court which had it in hand, and is so
well reported, that no one interested in
the subject should fail to read the full
report. The plaintiff, something under
fourteen years of age, and without any
experience in the use of machinery, was
employed by the defendants and set to
work at one end of a hemp-drawing
machine, which was nine or ten feet long,
about three feet wide and four high. At
the other end it was fed, usually by a boy,
the work being considered boy's work.
The plaintiff's duty was to guide the
hemp as it came in the form of a ribbon,
through a spout three or four inches wide
at his end of the machine, into a can,
press it down till the can was filled, remove it and put an empty one in its
place and repeat the process. The
usual way of breaking off the ribbon of
hemp, when the can became full, was to
extend the two arms forward, catch tie
ribbon on its opposite sides and pull it
apart laterally-when thus separated and
weakened it broke easily, and the more it
was separated the more easily it broke.
In thus separating the ribbon it was
natural for the hands to go in opposite
directions, a greater or less distance,
depending on the amount of force required to pull it apart. Parallel and
close to the machine at which plaintiff was
working when hurt was another of the
same kind, having a gearing of a number
of cog-wheels of different sizes on the
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side next to him, and projecting from the
second, because there was no evidence
surface about two inches; the centre of
of fault or neglect for which ttmey could
the space which they occupied on the beheld liable. The trial judge instructed
machine was about three feet from the the jury " That if the plaintiff could
ground. At the nearest points thc two
recover, it must be because from his
machines were but eleven inches apart, youth, inexperience and want of capacity
and the cog-wbeels were only eighteen
to appreciate and avoid the danger, it
inches from the spout through which can
became the duty of the defendants to
the hemp ribbon and where the liands take especial precautions for his protecwere applied to separate it in the fashion
tion which they had failed to do: * **
above described. Tie cogs stood a little That if he was manifestly incapable of
back of the line where plaintiff was
understanding and appreciating the danstanding when at work, and so that the ger to which lie was exposed by the
gearing was in full view, but they were
gearings, or manifestly incapable of perjust in a position where his left hand
forming the work there safely, there
would reach them if thrown out a little might be a breach of duty in placing him
too far as lie stood facing the machine at in that position where he would be so
which lie was working. Thefirst day lie
exposed, or, placing him there, in not
worked for the defendants lie was at giving him such instructions as would
some other machine of nearly the same enable him, with reasonable care on his
kind. The second day he was set to
part, to do his work there safely." The
work at the machine where he was hurt.
verdict was for the plaintiff. The
He had filled and removed one can and
Supreme Court approved this instruction,
when in the act of breaking off the rib- and GRAY, J., delivering the opinion,
bon of hemp, on the second having besaid: "The question on this branch of
come full, his left hand was caught the case is not one of due care on the
among the cog-wheels on cue adjoining
part of the plaintiff, but whether the
machine and badly mutilated. At the cause of the injury was one of which be
trial the plaintiff testified that when put
had knowingly assumed the risk, or one
to work on this machine he was told by of which, by reason of his incapacity to
the foreman that another boy, Manchester
understand and appreciate its dangerous
by name, who was then doing the ork character, or by reason of the neglect of
which plaintiff was to do, would tell him
the defendants to take due precautions to
how to attend tbe machine; that Maneffectually inform him thereof, the defendchester showed 1im how he did it and
ants were bound to indemnify him against
then went to the other end of the machine
the consequences. * * * The obligation
to feed it. It does not appear that any
of the detendants would not necessarily
warning was given to the boy of the
be discharged by merely informing the
danger from the cog-wheel genring. He
boy that the employment itself, or a paralso testified that he could see the gearticular place or machine in the room in
ing well enough when looking in that which he was set to work, was dangerdirection, but not when he was attending
ous." He further says, that the mere
to his work. The plaintiff claimed that
it was negligence on part of defendants
to have left the cog-gearing unfenced in
that situation. After the evidence of the
above facts was given with great detail,
defendants contended that plaintiff was
not ent~tled to recover, first, for failure
to prove that lie was using due care; and

information that the service or some
place or thing was dangerous might give
the boy no adequate understanding of
the kind and degree of danger which
would necessarily attend the actual performance of the work. The language
used in this opinion seems to warrant the
broad terms in which the rule in the
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principal case is expressed. But it must
be interpreted in relation to the peculiar
facts of the case. The boy, quite young
and wholly inexperienced with machinery,
was manifestly incapable of doing the
work in that particular situation with
safety to himself'; the close proximity
of the uncovered cog-gearing to his left
hand made his work extremely perilous ;
the more devoted his attention to his
work the greater became the danger from
this source. Under all the circumstances
of the case it was highly probable he
would be injured and the result was in
reason to be anticipated. The defendants
were in fault in placing him there to
work, and if they were willing to take
the risk of doing so, it is not perhaps too
severe to say that they could relieve
themselves only by giving such instructions and cautions to the boy as would
make him understand and enable him to
avoid the dangers. It is a suggestion
of a way of escape for defendants from
what otherwise would be the probable
consequences of their wrongful act in
placing an inexperienced child in such a
dangerous situation.
In Grizzle v. frkost, 3 Fost. & Fin.
622, CocxBunN, C. J., said to the jury:
" 1am of opinion that if owners of dangerous machinery employ about it a young
person quite inexperienced in its use,
either without proper directions as to its
use or with directions that are improper,
and that are likely to lead to danger, of
which the young person is not aware, as
it is their duty to take reasonable care
to avoid such danger, they are responsible for the injury which may ensue from
the useof such machinery." In this case,
a girl near sixteen years of age, and
never before employed about machinery,
was set to work about a hemp-drawing
machine. She testified that she had received no instructions or warning of the
dangers of her employment, and that two

or three days before she was hurt, defendant's foreman told her to pick up
the loose pieces of hemp from the floor

and put them between the rollers, and
that this act brought her fingers very close
to these rollers, in which, while repeating
the act in the same way in which she
had been told to do it, her fingers were
caught, and her hand and arm so crashed
that amputation became necessary.
The Missouri Pacic Bd. v. Peregoy,
14 Pac. Rep. 7, reported from the Kansas Supreme Court, is an instructive
case and will repay a careful reading.
The suit was brought by the mother of
James Peregoy, who was killed while in
the defendants' service in their machineshops. He was about seventeen years
of age ; he had no experience about
machinery when he entered defendants'
employment, where he served as an apprentice for about two months before the
accident which caused his death happened. He had been directed by the
foreman to assist another boy of near his
own age, Wirth by name, when called
on by the latter. Wirth, who was also
an apprentice, and unskilled in the work
he was put to, which it appears was difficult and dangerous, was engaged in
drilling an engine-frame weighing two
thousand pounds. Neither of them had
received any instruction or warning as to
the dangers of the work or that it required great care and attention to avoid
accidents. Wirth, having occasion to
move the frame, called Peregoy to assist
him, and they moved it so unskilfully
that it fell on the latter and killed him.
The Supreme Court, after stating that
defendants had put Wirth to do the work
of a skilled and experienced mechanic,
and had given him the authority to demand the help of others of less experience than himself, and had given neither
warning nor instruction that, if followed,
would have prevented the accident, and
that the foreman kuew, or ought to have
known, that Wirth's inexperience in
handling such heavy machinery would
result in accident, and that it became the
defendants' duty to warn Wirth of the
danger of the work placed under his con-
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trol, and to give him proper instructions,
added: "But, even having done this, we
cannot see that this would have excused
the defendants under the facts shown and
admitted in this case. The query is, can
a railroad company put inexperienced
and ignorant apprentices in places of
great danger, where the work can only
he safely done by experienced and skilled
mechanics, and give them warning and
instructions, and, after an accident, say
they took the risk incident to their employment with knowledge, and be thereby relieved from damages."
In The Atlas Engine Works v. Randall,
100 Ind. 293, it is said by MITCHELL,
J. : " One of the well-recognised duties
of the master is not to expose an inexperienced servant, at whose hands lie
requires a dangerous service, to such
danger without giving him warning. He
must also give him such instruction as
will enable him to avoid the injury, unless both the danger and the means of
avoiding it are apparent."
In this case
the plaintiff was near nineteen years of
age, of average intelligence for his age,
and the danger from the cog-wheels by
which he was hurt was not very great, and
was so apparent that lie must have known
it, and by the exercise of ordinary care, he
could have avoided the injury ; neither
the circumstances of the case nor the
result of the trial seem necessarily to
have called for the statement of so severe
a rule of duty for the master.
In PrentL9 v. Kent Furniture Manuf.
Co., 3 N. W. Rep. 109, decided by the
Supreme Court of Michigan in 1886, the
plaintiff was nineteen years of age, had
been in the defendants' employment
three years, and had run nearly all kinds
of machinery, and had worked three days
on the split-saw, at which he was hurt,
before he received the injury for which
he sued. Beld, " He could not hold the
defendants liable on the ground that he
was inexperienced, and that the defendants should have warned him of the danger." Plaintiff claimed thatin operating

the saw there were certain specified dangers which could be learned only by experience or instruction, neither of which
he had received ; but it did not appear
that the plaintiff's injury resulted from
such sources of danger. Held, "That
this exposure to a peculiar danger, which
could be avoided only by experience or
instruction, could not make the defendants liable, if such source of danger was
not the cause of the injury." This is
also illustrated by the principal case,
where the court say, " the injury did not
occur on account of any act done or
omitted on her part, because of any want
of knowledge or appreciation of the dangers of the machine."

Dowling v. Allen 4 Co., 74 Mo. 13, is
also a case of considerable interest. The
plaintiff, when hired by defendants' foreman, was seventeen years of age, and
was without experience about machinery.
After being employed two months in
running errands and doing light jobs, he
was set to work in defendants' foundry,
to help on a turn-table which defendants
were constructing. The turn-table was
thirty feet in diameter, and attached to
it was a revolving horizontal shaft twelve
feet long, five inches in diameter and ten
inches from the ground, and it was uncovered for the distance of about three
feet from the point of attachment to the
turn-table, and the employees were in
the habit of stepping over this part of the
shaft. The plaintiff attempted to do so,
when his clothing was caught by a projecting set-screw in a collar about the
shaft, close to the turn-table, and lie was
seriously hurt. This set-screw could not
be seen when the.shaft revolved rapidly.
The Supreme Court, after saying that
the servant takes on himself the ordinary
risks of his employment, and that if there
are concealed dangers known to the employer and unknown to the employee, it
is the duty of the master to notify the
servant of their existence, say: " We
think the doctrine equally well settled by
the authorities that although the ma-
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chinery, or that part of it complained of as
especially dangerous, is visible, yet if, by
reason of the youth and inexperience of
the servant, he is not aware of the danger to which he is exposed in operating it
or approaching near to it, it is the duty
of the master to apprise him of the danger, if known to him."
Jones v. Phillips, 39 Ark. 17 (1882),
is a carefully considered case. The court
below instructed the jury as to the extent
of the duty of the master to inform and
caution the employee in this case of and
against the dangers of the service in
which he was engaged, in terms as strong
and as severe upon the master as those
used inthe principal case. The plaintiff had a verdict. In the Supreme Court
this instruction was disapproved. Referring to it, EAxix, J., says : " The
instruction, properly qualified, might be
considered as embodying the abstract law
upon the points mentioned, but was in
the particular case calculated to mislead
and to make the impression upon the
jury of a minuteness and detail of precautionary instructions not generally required, nor in most cases practicable, * *
that there was no doubt but that the boy
was of sufficient intelligence to understand the nature of the very risk by
which he was injured, * * and that
the real questions presented by the evidence were, whether he was wrongfully
caused to incur it (the danger), and
whether, whilst incurring it, he exercised the care and circumspection to
avoid it, which might reasonably be expected from his years. This case is well
worth readina, for this as well as
several other questions involved. It will
probably give the impression that it does
not accord with,or is opposed to, the strict
rule of the principal case. On a review
of the above-cited cases it will appear
that of the several elements for consideration by an employer of persons of immature years, in order that the youth may
be properly and sufficiently informed of
the dangers of his employment, the first

in importance is the kind and degree of
the perils to which he will be exposed.
These may be so great that scarcely any
amount of instruction will suffice and justify
the employer in a given case in subjecting the youthful employee to the
risks, as where the work can be done
safely only by persons of experience and
skill. The next in order is age. The
employee may be so young as not easily
to be made to comprehend the dangers
of his work, or to be taught how to avoid
them, or so near maturity as to be on a
par with persons of adult years. Following these come a youth's apparent intelligence and previous experience about
On consideration of these
machinery.
several elements together and in relation
to each other, the employer, if he be a
person of ordinary sense and judgment,
will with reasonable certainty be able to
discharge his whole duty to his youthful
servants. The rule of law which puts
upon the employee the risks of the business or employment in which he is engaged, or, as it is often put, the risks
incident to the employment, is based
on the assumption that the employee
knows the risks, that they are apparent
and usual in the business, and he is not
held to assume or bear the risk of unknown, or undisclosed, or extraneous
perils. As illustrating this rule or principle applied to servants, irrespective of
their age, may be cited Smith v. Oxford
Iron Co., 42 N. J. 467. The plaintiff
was engaged as a miner, and when first
employed the defendants were using orSubsequently
dinary blasting powder.
they introduced into use giant powder,
a highly dangerous substance, and of the
dangerous quality of which, as well as
the method of using it, the plaintiff was
wholly ignorant. The Supreme Court
say: "It is clearly shown that it (giant
powder) was a highly dangerous explosive, and that the proper manner of using
it was not made known to the plaintiff,
*
*
*
itwas adutywbich the
*
company owed to the plaintiff to ascer-
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tain and make known its properties and

his death the fall was about six feet. The
defendant called the deceased, who was
it was gross negligence in the company a common laborer, and another man who
to furnish such an article for a laborer's was used to the business, to help him
use without giving him the requisite in- pound on the top stone, and when the
formation." In Mo. Pac. Rd. v. Call- fall began the defendant and his skilled
breath, I S. W. Rep. 622, reported from man safely sprang to the curb or top
the Texas Supreme Court 1886, the wall, but the deceased went down with
plaintiff recovered for injuries received the fall and could not be got out alive.
while engaged in coupling cars for the CooLpr, J., delivering the opinion of the
defendants. By long experience he was court said, among other things in referfamiliar with the ordinary dangers at- ence to the liability of the defendant,
tending such work. He was placed in " he took an inexperienced man into a
defendants'yards as helper or car coupler. place of danger, without apprising him
After a few hours work, by coupling cars of the risks, and that danger was to be
in the usual way, standing between the anticipated. It is true that workmen in
platforms, he was injured by a patent the business testify they do not consider
coupling contrivance which made it dan- it dangerous, and probably it is not when
gerous for him to stand in that position one fully understands it; but this man
while doing his work. He had never did not fully understand it, and the danseen or heard of the patent arrangement ger and loss of life came to him in conand it was not in general use. The sequence. The neglect consisted mainly
court held, that of the dangers of an in not informing him."
occupation which the master knows or
Other cases illustrating this principle
ought to know, and the servant does not are Wheeler v. Wason A anuf. Co., 135
know, the master is bound to warn the Mass. 294; Baker v. Allegheny Rd., 95
servant fully, and is liable for it if the Pa. St. 211 ; Baxter v. Roberts, 44 Cal.
servant is injured in consequence of
187 : also cases cited in foot note to _1o.
neglect of this duty. Parkhurstv. John- Pac. Railroadv. Callbreath, supra, and
son, 50 Mich. 70, where the widow sued Woods' Law of Master and Servant,
for the death of her husband in conse- sec. 349, (p. 716 of 2d ed.), sec. 353,
quence of defendant's alleged neglect to p. 729 and foot note 6 ; also see. 359, p.
inform him of the danger of the simple 738, where the question is well discussed
process of limeburning.
When the and many cases cited.
stones at the bottom of the kiln were
The nile which requires a master to
sufficiently burned they were taken out, make known to his servant the latent or
leaving a vacant or hollow place-the unusual dangers of an employment, of
stones above not being sufficiently burned which the servant cannot otherwise be
kept their place by lateral pressure. To presumefl to know, is founded on the
get the stone above down, men stood on evident fact that the latter cannot in
the top and pounded with heavy irons un- reason be made to assume the risks of
til
it began to settle into the vacant place.
which he is ignorant, and the same reaAs the falling began at the bottom son lies at the foundation of the rule laid
and could be heard, the men so engaged down in the principal case. It is indeed
took warning and jumped to the curb or the same rule extended in its applicatop of the wall to avoid going down tion to persons of immature Years and exwith the fall, which was usually from two perience where in many cases the comto four feet, and more when the quantity mon dangers, which are apparent to
taken out below was unusually large. On adults, are to them unknown and hidthe occasion when plaintiffs intestate met den perils. With what reason can they
the mode of using it,

*

*

*

*

*
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be said to assume the risks ordinarily incident to an employment so long as they
do not know and comprehend what
these risks are. This is not exacted of
adults, why should it be of infants?
Mi. Justice GRAY points this out in
Cooinbs v. New Bedford Cordage Co.,
supra, where he says "the question is
* * * whether he (the plaintiff)
knowingly assumed the risks, &c.," as
above quoted.
It is to be noted that the infant employee, when properly instructed, is, by
law, made to assume the risks of the employment as well and as fully as is an
adult, including injuries resulting from
the negligence of a co-employee. See
Curran v. 11erchants' ilanuf. Co., 130
Mass. 374, where a boy fourteen years
of age, who had for two years been employed at cleaning machinery, was injured by the carelessness of a fellow-servant in starting up the machinery. It
was held the masterwas not liable. King
v. Boston, 4-c., Rd., 9 Cush. 112, and
De Graff"v. N. Y. Cent., ,-c., Rd.,
76 N. Y. 125, also illustrates this. In
the latter, the Court of Appeals, after
stating the general rule relating to the
assumption of risks by the servant, say,
"and the fact that thie employee is a
minor does not, if he is of age sufficient,
and is competent for the service in which
he is employed, affect the duty or liability
of the corporation ; the risks are an element of the employment, and the employee cannot claim on account of infancy
to be relieved from the consequences of
such risks." See also Thompson on Negligence, vol. II., p. 977, and cases referred to in foot-notes.
The requisite information of the dan-

gers of an employment need not necessarily be given to the inexperienced youth
by the master himself-the essential
thing is that the servant should have it.
It may come by experience, as in the
principal case, where the courts, after
stating that the plaintiff, although not
instructed by the plaintiff or his agents,
had acquired the information from practical experience, say: "she knew therefore all that the instructions of the defendant would have imparted to her.
This was enough." See also Prentiss v.
Kent Furniture Manuf. Co., supra, and
Sullivan v. India Manuf. Co., supra.
But where the duty of giving information and warning to servants, infants or
adults rests on the master, he cannot be
discharged from that duty by merely delegating it to a third person. The duty
must be actually performed, and he is
liable for a neglect of it. See Wheeler v.
Wason Mianuf. Co., supra.
As to the third ground on which the
plaintiff in the principal case based her
right to recover, to wit, defendant's violation of the original contract of her employment, by taking her from safe work
and placing her at the work of feeding a
dangerous machine, and on which the
court expresses no opinion, see the case
of Prentiss v. Kent Manuf. Co., supra,
where the plaintiff having objected to
working at a split-saw was told by defendant's foreman that he could either
operate it or lie off, and he chose to operate it, it was held that the defendant
would not be made liable, on the ground
that plaintiff was put on different work
from that he was employed to do.
A. B. SHEARER.
Phila.

